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The purpose of this thesis is to determine if offset agreements, as a condition of sale of 
military articles, have an adverse effect on the U.S. national security and the defense industrial 
base. The effects of offset agreements are measured from the context of their implications 
for defense preparedness, competitiveness of U.S. defense companies in the world's arms 
market, levels of foreign dependence in U.S. weapon systems and the transfer of technology 
to foreign countries and competitors. Additionally, offset agreements are analyzed as a 
contributory factor to the globalization of the arms industry and its consequences on the 
existing defense industrial base evaluated. It is concluded that the future arms market will 
consist of increased transnational cooperation, requiring the U.S. defense industry to establish 
strong relationships with foreign counterparts to retain access to their markets. Additionally, 
the increase in arms producers in the world will challenge arms control efforts and require 
continued technological innovation to prevent the U.S. lead from eroding further. 
IV 
 
e rpose f t is t esis is to eter i e if ffset a ree e ts, as a c ition f sale f 
ilit r  rti l s,   rs  ff t  t e . . ti l rit   t e f s  i strial 
.  ff ts f ff t r ts r  r   t  t t f t ir i li ti s 
  , iti  f . .  i   t  l '   
  .       
   
   
IV 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION  1 
A. PURPOSE 1 
B. BACKGROUND 1 
C. THESIS OBJECTIVES 2 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 3 
1. Primary 3 
2. Subsidiary 3 
E. METHODOLOGY 3 
F. SCOPE OF THESIS 4 
G. ORGANIZATION 5 
II. SECURITY ASSISTANCE 7 
A. SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND FOREIGN POLICY 7 
B. U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE HISTORY 8 
C. EARLY SECURITY ASSISTANCE POLICY 10 
D. PRESENT SECURITY ASSISTANCE POLICY 13 
E. U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 15 
1. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 15 
2. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) Program 16 
3. Commercial Sales Licensed under the AECA 16 
F. U.S. GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE 
16 
1. Authorizations:  17 
2. Appropriations   17 
G. DOD ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE 17 
H. FOREIGN MILITARY SALES PROCESS 21 
A E F NTENTS 
1. I TI  .................................................. 1 
. P SE .............................................. '" . 1 
.  ............................................. 1 
. I  J I  ........................................ 2 
.  I  ..................................... 3 
. ri r  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
. i i r  ............................................. 3 
. OLOGy ............................................ 3 
.    ........................................... 4 
 ............................................ 5 
  ........................................... 7 
................ 7






.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1  
. . . 
...................................................... 16 
1. t ri ti : ........................................ 1  
. r ri ti  ........................................ 1  
.  I I   I  I  ............ 1  
. I : I I  S   ................ '" ..... 21 
v 
I. SUMMARY  22 
HI. OFFSETS, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS   25 
A. INTRODUCTION 25 
B. OFFSETS   26 
C. CONGRESSIONAL CONCERNS - IMPACT OF OFFSETS   28 
D. DEFENSE INDUSTRY REACTION   32 
E. EXECUTIVE BRANCH POLICIES   35 
IV. OFFSETS IN MILITARY EXPORTS, THE OMB STUDY   39 
A. BACKGROUND 39 
B. GENERAL SURVEY RESULTS 41 
C. DEFENSE PREPAREDNESS AND INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS 
44 
D. OFFSET IMPACT ON EMPLOYMENT 47 
E. OFFSET IMPACT ON TRADE 50 
F. SUMMARY 55 
V. OFFSET   AGREEMENTS   AND   THE   GLOBALIZATION   OF   DEFENSE 
PRODUCTION 57 
A. GENERAL   57 
B. OFFSETS AND GLOBALIZATION ■ 58 
1. Patriot Missile System 63 
2. AWACS  65 
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF GLOBALIZATION 67 
D. CONSEQUENCES OF OFFSETS IN GLOBALIZATION 71 
E. SUMMARY 74 
VI 
I. ~Y ................................................ 22 
III. S S, ITIC L  IC I I TI S .............. 25 
. I TI  ........................................... 25 
. S ................................................. 26 
. I   - I    .......... 2  
.  I  I  ............................ 32 
. I   I I  ............................. 35 
.    ,    ................ 39 
 ............................................ 39 
    ................................ 4
   
...................................................... 44 
  .......................... 4
  ................................. 5
~Y ................................................ 55 
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5  
.  ................................................ 5  
 .............................  
. t i il  t  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 
.  ............................................. 65 
. I I  I  .................... 6  
.    I  I I  ............ 7  
. ~Y ................................................ 74 
VI 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS   75 
A. DEFENSE PREPAREDNESS 76 
B. INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS 79 
C. NATIONAL SECURITY 81 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 83 
1. Overview of Current Initiatives 83 
2. Military and Commercial Research and Development 85 
3. Foreign Sourcing 8* 
4. Defense Industrial Base 86 
5. Globalization 87 
6. Export Controls and Proliferation  87 
E. FUTURE RESEARCH AREAS 90 
LIST OF REFERENCES   91 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST   94 
vn 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ........................ 75 
A. DEFENSE PREPAREDNESS .................................. 76 
B. INDUSTRIAL CO PETITIVENESS ............................ 79 
C. NATIONAL SECURITY ...................................... 81 
. E E TI S ...................................... 83 
1. vervie  of urrent Initiatives ............................ 83 
2. ilitary and o ercial esearch and evelop ent ............ 85 
. reign rcing ....................................... 85 
. f se I strial se .................................. 86 
. l li ti  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 
. t t l   li ti  .......................... 87 
   ................................. 90 





The purpose of this thesis is to determine if offset agreements, as a condition of sale 
of military articles, have an adverse effect on the U.S. national security and the defense 
industrial base. The effects of offset agreements will be measured from the context of their 
implications for defense preparedness, competitiveness of U.S. defense companies in the 
world's arms market, levels of foreign dependence in U.S. weapon systems and the transfer 
of technology to foreign countries and competitors. Additionally, offset agreements will be 
evaluated as a contributory factor to the globalization of the arms industry and its 
consequences evaluated. 
B. BACKGROUND 
Following the end of World War II, the United States of America emerged as the 
world leader in providing military arms and material to allied and other friendly countries. 
The transfer of military arms has been traditionally accomplished through a buyer-seller 
relationship; however, in today's environment of exporting military arms, such is not the case. 
Today's military arms market can be best described as one that transcends monetary 
issues and focuses on other benefits to the recipient country in the form of offsets. Offsets, 
whether direct or indirect, are terms of a sale, whereby the purchasing country receives 
additional consideration beyond the military equipment itself. This additional consideration 
can range from requiring an aerospace firm to sell Hungarian hams in the U.S. to a 
requirement that a certain percentage of contracted-related work be performed in the 
recipient country by its citizens. While the former can be amusing, the later could have some 
rather dire consequences for the United States' ability to maintain the "technological edge" 
and U.S. defense industries' ability to remain competitive if the "know-how" is being provided 
to potential foreign competitors. 
Offset agreements are an important aspect in closing a sale of U.S. arms in the 
international arms market.  In today's competitive environment, the quality and price of a 
.
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weapon system are not the only factors involved. Foreign buyers are exceedingly interested 
in not only purchasing the new weapon system, but also in improving their own industrial and 
economic position. Offset agreements have become a necessity to compete in the arms 
market. 
The desire on the part of the foreign buyer to improve its own arms production 
capability has led to globalization of the arms industry. U.S. defense firms must enter into 
cooperative agreements with either foreign governments or firms to sell their products. This 
diversification of arms production has led to an interdependence. Indigenous production of 
weapon systems solely within the borders of a single country may no longer be possible. Each 
nation is somewhat dependent on others to provide resources, components and subassemblies 
to manufacture weapon systems and must cooperate with these foreign entities in order to 
compete in the future. 
C. THESIS OBJECTIVES 
The objective of this research is to determine the impact of foreign offset 
requirements, as a condition of purchase for American military material, on the U.S. and the 
defense industry. It will discuss the emergence of the U.S. as the world leader in the military 
arms market since the end of World War II and how the U.S. has used security assistance 
programs as an arm to implement its foreign policy. 
An interagency study on offset agreements chaired by the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) will be evaluated to determine the effects offset agreements have had in the 
past. Its data will be used as a basis to determine the implications offset agreements in the 
areas of defense preparedness, foreign dependence and technology transfer. 
An analysis of the OMB study will be conducted to determine how offset agreements 
in the past have contributed to the globalization phenomenum. Foreign policy goals and 
support for NATO allies will be discussed as the motivation behind our implicit support of 
offset agreements. Additionally, the emergence of Western Europe as a major competitor in 
the arms market will be discussed, highlighting an increased level of cooperation required of 





Lastly, the increase of arms producing countries to include the emergence of the Third 
World countries as providers of arms to other developing countries and its implications to 
arms control efforts, caused by offset agreements will be analyzed. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary 
Do offset requirements, as a condition of a military export sale, have a negative impact 
on the U.S. national security and the defense industrial base? 
2. Subsidiary 
• Do offset agreements affect U.S. defense preparedness? 
• Do offset agreements increase the level of foreign dependence in U.S. weapon 
systems? 
• What are the consequences of offset agreements that transfer technology abroad 
for the U.S.? 
• How have offset agreements contributed to the globalization of the arms industry? 
• What are the implications of globalization for the U.S. defense industry and U.S. 
national security policy? 
• What political pressures are prevalent with offset issues? 
• What are the implications of offsets for the defense industry? 
• What is the United States policy on Foreign Military Sales and offsets? 
E. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology for research for this thesis will include literature reviews, interviews 
with defense industry representatives and review of U.S. Government documents related to 
offsets published by the Office of Management and Budget, Defense Security Assistance 
Agency and Departments of Commerce and State. The evaluation of the interagency model 
will examine the underlying assumptions they used, their methodology and their assessment 
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of the impact of offset agreements. The results of this evaluation will be used to determine 
the significance offset agreements have had in the globalization of the arms industry, to 
include early agreements with NATO and current practices that extend into the Middle East, 
Asia and Latin America. 
The analysis of the interagency study will also include cross referencing their results 
with other studies available from the Department of Commerce and the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency. The Department of Commerce publishes annual reports that discuss 
the trade imbalance the U.S. has with its trading partners for both defense and non-defense 
sectors. Additionally, with the technology transferred to foreign countries in the form of 
offsets identified in the interagency study, the globalization trend can be analyzed to determine 
to what extent offset agreements have contributed to it. 
The reports available from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency will also 
indicate the level of weapon systems production that is being done by foreign countries that 
were beneficiaries of U.S. offset agreements. In the case of the European consortium, Canada 
and South Korea, their own defense production capabilities were enhanced by direct offset 
agreements provided by U.S. defense contractors, resulting in an increased self-sufficiency 
in defense articles and loss of sales to U.S. defense contractors. 
The analysis of the OMB study will provide the basis for determining how offset 
agreements have been used in the past and their relative impact. The types of offset 
agreements will also indicate their contribution to globalization of arms production. 
F. SCOPE OF THESIS 
Some observers view offsets, which have become an important feature of U.S. military 
sales in recent years, as having a negative impact on national security and the U.S. economy. 
This view persists even though these sales are entered into voluntarily by the U.S. sellers. 
This voluntary aspect of offset agreements implies that the sellers of these goods believe they 
are better off with the sales. This research is designed to evaluate the impact of this belief on 
the U.S. economy from a macro-economic perspective and its implications for defense 
preparedness, foreign dependency and technology transfer. Additionally, this research will 
of the impact of of set agre ments. The results of this evaluation wil  be used to determine 
the significance of set agre ments have had in the globalization of the arms industry, to 
include early agre ments with NATO and cur ent practices that extend into the Middle East, 
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extend this evaluation into the international arms market, analyzing its influence on the 
globalization trend. 
This thesis will not evaluate the globalization of the arms industry in detail, rather only 
the role of offset agreements, as a mechanism of globalization. It will analyze how offset 
agreements to NATO contributed to the development of a Western European arms industry 
and how similar agreements between industrialized nations and Third World countries are 
creating a similar industry in the developing world. 
This research will not attempt to determine the true impact of offsets on low tier 
defense contractors, but rather provide general conclusions on their effects. 
G. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II establishes the background of security assistance as an element of foreign 
policy by examining its historical use by the U.S. from 1776 to the present. It will illustrate, 
as U.S. prominence as a world power grew, how our foreign policy, and in turn security 
assistance, has changed. This chapter will also discuss how security assistance programs are 
administered by the Executive Branch and the influence the Legislative Branch has on its 
objectives. 
Chapter III will provide information on offset agreements as a condition of sale and 
explain the different types of direct and indirect offset agreements. The prevailing attitude 
within the Executive and Legislative Branch, as well as the U.S. defense industry will also be 
presented. 
Chapter IV will analyze the 1990 OMB study of offset agreements and their effects 
on the U.S. economy, defense preparedness, industrial competitiveness and employment. 
Chapter V will extend the analysis of the 1990 OMB study into the present time by 
evaluating how offset agreements concluded during that time period have contributed to the 
globalization of the arms industry. This chapter will analyze how offsets have helped post- 
World War II allies and enemies recover economically and militarily from that war. Current 
trends in offset agreements as they relate to globalization will also be examined to determine 
their effects on foreign sourcing of components and subassemblies to U.S. produced weapon 
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systems, erosion of the U.S. technological edge and the increase in the arms producing 
countries in the world. General observations on how offset agreements have detracted from 
attempts to counter arms proliferation and production by developing countries will also be 
evaluated. 
Chapter VI draws conclusions from the analysis and provides recommendations on 
a framework to maintain the U.S. technological edge through research and development 
efforts, means of measuring U.S. foreign dependence and methods for guarding against 
critical levels of dependency in weapon subsystems and components. This chapter will also 
provide methods for controlling the spread of arms production capabilities and arms 
proliferation originating from the Third World. 
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H. SECURITY ASSISTANCE 
In recent years, the centerpiece of discussion and study within the DoD has been the 
changing threat to U.S. security. Over the four decades of the Cold War, deterring the threat 
of Soviet aggression in Europe and containing the spread of communism dominated our 
security agenda. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, our identifiable foe 
has been replaced by other, less identifiable threats, such as the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons, terrorism and ethnic conflicts. Winning two near simultaneous major regional 
contingencies (MRC) is our strategic objective, but which MRCs remain a mystery. The 
U.S. has also found itself involved in smaller non-traditional conflicts in Somalia, Rwanda and 
Haiti. How can the U.S. remain prepared to fight and win the major wars of the future, while 
maintaining the regional stability throughout the world? 
A partial answer to this question can be found in an old answer. To respond to the 
new world order, the United States should retain its strong military and it should continue to 
invest in security assistance programs that help to accomplish our national security goals. As 
this chapter will illustrate, this strategy has helped the U.S. attain its current status as a world 
power and its continued use will aid in affirming that status in the future. 
A. SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND FOREIGN POLICY 
One of the primary methods to implement our foreign and national security policy has 
been the transfer of defense articles, services, military training and economic assistance. 
Collectively referred to as Security Assistance it is an umbrella term that encompasses a 
number of military and economic programs. Designed to support our national security and 
foreign policy, security assistance serves the U.S. interest by assisting allies and friends to 
acquire and maintain the tools of war, and to use them for self-defense. This assistance is 
especially important in regions of the world where the U.S. has vested national security 
concerns. Such assistance is viewed as a means to help other countries attack the causes of 
economic and political instability. The defense of the free world is a joint endeavor, and as 
such, the U.S. must continue to maintain its own military capabilities and assist its friends and 
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allies to strengthen theirs. 
In President Reagan's FY1988 budget request to Congress, he included the general 
objectives and linkage between security assistance and U.S. foreign policy: 
For more than forty years, security assistance has been an essential element of 
U.S. efforts to help build a more secure and peaceful world. Successive 
Administrations, backed by bipartisan support in Congress, have recognized 
the indispensable role security assistance plays in the successful conduct of 
global foreign and defense policies. The U.S. commitment to an effective 
security assistance effort reflects two fundamental tenets of our post World 
War II approach to national security and the protection of U.S. interests: a 
foreign policy based on global engagement and collective security, and a 
military strategy of deterrence and forward defense. Security assistance is an 
essential instrument in the implementation and integration of these twin pillars 
of our national policy. By helping friends and allies to acquire the means to 
defend themselves, the United States complements the rebuilding of its own 
military strength and increases the human and material resources available for 
the defense of free world interests. (DIS AM, 1989) 
Security assistance is by no means a modern phenomenon, but has been a part of 
international relations as long as man has been engaged in war. Whether motivated by 
economic gains or through the realization that a particular combatant is preferable to the 
other, security assistance attempts to establish and reinforce relationships that are beneficial 
to the country providing the aid. 
B. U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE HISTORY 
The first U.S. experience with security assistance was unlike the experiences of today. 
Throughout the American revolution and well into the early days of the U.S. being a new 
sovereign nation, much of its support was provided from France in the form of arms and other 
military assistance. The French aid was not entirely altruistic on their part, but rather a means 
to limit the British expansion in North America. It was in France's own national interest to 
have Britain's attention directed to a war with the U.S. while the French could expand and 
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ofNicaragua and more recently me Cuban Missile Crisis, Grenada and Haiti.(DISAM 1989) 
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adventurtsm during fte early years of fte Twentieth century, a belief,ha. would be soon 
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With the onset of orld ar 1, the United States quickly became a leading participant 
in the international munitions trade. Accounting for more than 52 percent of the global arms 
export market by 1920, the U.S. during its period of neutrality (1914-1917) exported 
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approximately $2.2 billion in war supplies to Europe.(Pierre, 1979) The U.S. engagement 
in the arms trade, which indirectly contributed to the entry of the U.S. in World War I, was 
the subject of much debate. The prominent international lawyer, Charles Hyde, petitioned 
then Secretary of State Lansing to reduce the U.S. arms trade. Hyde stated the U.S. was 
becoming"... a base of supplies of such magnitude that unless retarded, the success of armies, 
possible the fate of empires, may ultimately rest upon the output of American 
factories. "(Pierre, 1979). While President Wilson saw the American arms capability as an 
"arsenal of freedom," the impact of providing arms to friendly or allied nations was not lost 
on the U.S. foreign policy makers. The U.S., with its past isolationist policies, was not 
accustomed to the influence such a capability had in shaping world events, but would be one 
it would use to its advantage in the future. 
The period between the World Wars saw the U.S. return to its isolationist policies. 
With public sentiment supporting a withdrawal from world affairs and the findings of the Nye 
Committee1 that the way to stop war was to take away the opportunity for private gain, the 
U.S. Government took measures that provided for more governmental control and oversight 
over the U.S. arms market in the form of the Munitions Control Board. The new Board's 
responsibility also included the adoption of international arms controls, but after some 
ineffectual efforts, the international arms trade remained unregulated. The Munitions Control 
Board's effect on U.S. arms exports also had very little impact. In 1936 the U.S. remained 
third in world arms sales behind France and Great Britain, a position it held until the outbreak 
of World War H.(DISAM, 1989) 
C. EARLY SECURITY ASSISTANCE POLICY 
World War II signaled a fundamental change in U.S. foreign policy as it related to the 
arms trade. Prior to the U.S. entry into World War n, the Neutrality Act was revised in 1939 
allowing the sale of arms during peacetime to the British on a cash and carry basis.  This 
1A Senate Munitions Investigating Committee headed by Senator Gerald Nye investigated 
if commercial profit motive was the primary cause and continued sustenance of war. 
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policies were eventually broadened to include arms support for other members of the allied 
nations. One such broadening of U.S. policy was the Lend-Lease program enacted by 
Congress on 11 March 1941. Eventually providing about $50 billion of arms, food and other 
aid to our allies including China and Russia, the Lend Lease program "lent" materials to Allies 
under the premise that it would be paid back or replaced in kind by materials provided to the 
U.S.2 (DISAM, 1989) 
These actions, coupled with the prominent role played by the U.S. in World War II 
set the stage for the post-war scene dominated by the superpowers, the United States and 
USSR. Confronted with a diametrically opposed philosophy, subsequent post-World War II 
Presidents formulated doctrines to combat this new threat. President Truman, under what 
came to be known as the Truman Doctrine, requested Congress to appropriate $400 million 
to aid Turkey and Greece in combating the communist insurrection in March of 1947. 
(DISAM 1989) Eventually receiving over $600 million in aid over the next three years, the 
U.S. assistance focused primarily on the transfer of surplus U.S. arms free of charge as "grant 
aid" under the new Military Assistance Program. (DISAM 1989) The Truman Doctrine, 
coupled with other programs such as the Marshall Plan, became an essential element of the 
containment policy to frustrate Soviet attempts to expand their military, political and 
economic base in Europe. 
The containment policy and its role in the Cold War strategy took another turn at the 
creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949. Founded on the 
Brussels Treaty of 1948 between France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Netherlands and 
Luxembourg, the NATO alliance provided the foundation for increased and preferential 
treatment of NATO member countries for security assistance management, to include: 
provisions of arms, exclusions from arms control legislation, and international cooperative 
armaments projects. This preferential treatment accounted for NATO countries in 1965 
receiving approximately 56 percent of all American arms transferred under the Military 
2
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contributions. 
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Assistance Program and Foreign Military Sales Program (Pierre, 1979). 
During the 1950s, however, certain new developments changed how that assistance 
was provided. With World War II stockpiles dwindling, U.S. aid came in the form of 
technical assistance and industrial equipment to expand local European defense production. 
Caveated with the agreement that the U.S.-assisted European defense contractors would 
provide arms at reasonable prices to other NATO member countries, this agreement proved 
to be short lived. As each country's arms production capability increased, their government 
demanded arms of local designs, development and production to increase the self- 
sufficiency of its arms production capability and economic development. NATO member 
countries were no longer satisfied with purchasing arms from the U.S., United Kingdom and 
France on the traditional buyer-seller relationship, but were motivated by both national 
security and economic factors to develop that capability inherently. 
The expansion of the U.S. containment policy continued to grow by including the 
Middle East, Southeast Asia and Latin America. Broadened by doctrines such as the 
Eisenhower Doctrine3, U.S. foreign policy expanded the containment strategy to apply to the 
protection not only of nations on the periphery of the Soviet Union, but of the world at large, 
including many nations regarded by their leaders as nonaligned (Farley, 1978). President 
Kennedy's "Alliance for Progress" provided economic assistance to Latin America to create 
a stable social structure capable of fending off revolutionary threats, with the implied 
objective of restraining the expansion of Cuban influence in the region (DISAM 1989). 
It was during the Nixon administration that we find many of the features of present 
day U.S. security assistance policy formalized. Promulgated under what was termed the 
Nixon Doctrine was the view that although the U.S. would continue to bear responsibility for 
the deterrence of nuclear and general war, the responsibility for localized wars remained the 
responsibility of those countries threatened by it. U.S. assistance would continue in the form 
of grant assistance, and not necessarily military forces. As summarized by one analyst, 
3The Eisenhower Doctrine asserted the right of the U.S. to commit forces to assist any 







The central thesis of the doctrine is that, although the United States will 
participate in the development of security for friends and allies, the major 
effort must be made by the governments and peoples of these states. The 
doctrine was mainly a product of public reaction against the major but largely 
unsuccessful military intervention by the United States in Vietnam during the 
1960s. As policy, it promulgation was directly related to efforts of the Nixon 
Administration to extricate American forces from Indochina (Piano and 
Greenburg, 1976). 
U.S. material military assistance continued to grow during the early 1970s. With 
regional instability evident in the Middle East, U.S. transfer of arms to Iran, Israel and Saudi 
Arabia, and additional arms exports from France and Great Britain, a seemingly 
uncontrollable arms race appeared to be occurring. With the post-Vietnam War experiences 
still fresh in their minds, U.S. public awareness increased. Congress moved to legislate 
greater control over the future transfer of arms, resulting in the Arms Export Control Act 
(AECA)4 which has had a significant influence on all subsequent security assistance 
management. The AECA, considered by Presidents Ford and Carter as extremely restrictive 
and impinging on the Executive Branch's prerogative to implement foreign policy, signaled 
congressional assertion of a major role in the foreign policy arena and ushered in a new era 
where arms transfers conducted under the guise of foreign policy would be subject to 
increased congressional oversight. 
D. PRESENT SECURITY ASSISTANCE POLICY 
Under the Reagan, Bush and Clinton Administration, the basic tenant of arms transfers 
as a means to support national interests remains essentially unchanged from those of previous 
administrations. President Reagan, however, on 8 July 1981 announced a new Conventional 
Arms Transfer Policy which viewed arms transfers as an essential element of our global 
defense policy and an indispensable component of U.S. foreign policy. President Reagan's 
4The Arms Export Control Act essentially prohibited arms transfer to nations found in 
systematic violation of human rights. 
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views reflected a more pragmatic view of security assistance and included the following 
points: 
• Reinforce military capabilities to assist in the deterrence of aggression, especially 
from the USSR and its surrogates and reduce the requirement for direct U.S. 
involvement in regional conflict. 
• Reinforce the perception of friends and allies that the U.S., as a partner, is also a 
reliable supplier with a measurable and enduring stake in the security of the 
recipient country. 
• Point out to potential enemies that the U.S. will not abandon its allies or friends 
or allow them to be militarily disadvantaged. 
• Improve the American economy by assuring a more stable defense production 
base, and by enhancing the balance of payments. However, this objective should 
not be construed that the approval of the transfer of arms will be based solely or 
even primarily on economic consideration and gain. 
• Enhance the effectiveness of the U.S. military through improved possibilities of 
access to regional bases, ports, or facilities needed for support of deployed forces 
during contingencies. Further, security assistance should be such as to improve the 
ability of the host nations to complement U.S. forces during deployments. 
• Strengthen the stability of a region and the internal security of the countries therein 
by fostering a sense of a recipient nation's security and thereby its willingness to 
settle disputes amicably. Through this objective, it is held that a government which 
feels secure is more likely to cope with such challenges in a more progressive and 
enlightened manner. 
A pivotal point of the Reagan policy was that the U.S. would assess the transfer of 
arms in light of the net contribution such transfers make to U.S. global or regional security. 
His policy specifically states that economic interests would not be the sole or primary reason 
behind such a transfer. This distinction will prove to be an issue with a Congress that does 
not feel foreign policy is outside of their realm of influence or responsibility. 
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E. U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 
As noted above, security assistance is an umbrella term that means different things to 
different people. For the purposes of this research, the following DoD definition of security 
assistance, will be used: 
Groups of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Acto of 1961, as 
amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other 
related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military 
training, and other defense related services, by grant, credit, or cash sales, in 
furtherance of national policies and objectives. (JCS Pub 1, 1987) 
The U.S. security assistance program is comprised of seven major component programs. 
(DISAM 1989) 
• Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Foreign Military Construction Sales Program 
• Foreign Military Financing Program 
• Commercial Sales Licensed under the AECA 
• Military Assistance Program (MAP) 
• International Military Education and Training (TMET) Program 
• Economic Support Fund 
• Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) 
For purposes of this research, the focus will be on the top three components. These are 
defined as follows (DISAM 1989). 
1. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 
FMS is a non-appropriated program through which eligible foreign governments 
purchase defense articles, services, and training from the United States Government. 
15 
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2. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) Program 
The FMF program is authorized under the provisions of Sections 23, 24 and 31 of the 
AECA and originally served to provide an effective means for easing the transition of foreign 
governments from grant aid to cash purchases. Currently the FMF program provides funds 
to recipient countries to be used for purchases of U.S. arms. FMF funds are either provided 
as grants or loans at concessional (reduced interest) rates. 
3. Commercial Sales Licensed under the AECA 
A commercial sale licensed under the AECA is a sale made by U.S. industry directly 
to a foreign buyer. Unlike procedures employed for FMS, the commercial sale transaction 
are not administered by DoD and do not involve a government to government agreement. 
The U.S. Government control procedure is accomplished through licensing by the Office of 
Munitions Control, Department of State. Day to day rules and procedures for these types of 
sales are contained in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). 
F. U.S. GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE 
The U.S. Security Assistance Program was created by U.S. public law. While the 
administration of security assistance is vested in the Executive Branch, the Congress, by 
virtue of Article 1, Section I of the U.S. Constitution, which gives it all legislative power, 
exerts influence in several ways: 
1. Development, consideration and action on legislation to establish or amend basic 
security assistance authorization acts. 
2. Enactment of appropriation acts. 
3. Passage of Joint Resolutions in the form of a Continuing Resolution Authority 
(CRA) to permit the incurrence of obligations to carry on essential security assistance 
program activities until appropriation action is complete. 
4 Hearings and investigations into special areas of interest, to include instructions 
to the General Accounting Office (GAO), the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), 
and Congressional Research Service (CRS) to accomplish special reviews. 
5. Ratification of treaties which may have security assistance implications. (DISAM, 
1989) 
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Additionally, Congress is assigned power by Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution to 
regulate commerce with foreign nations, while Article IV, Section 3 indicates that the 
"Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations 
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States". (DISAM, 1989) 
Congress performs these responsibilities through its committees of both Houses of 
Congress. The primary committees of Congress involved with security assistance legislation 
are: (DISAM, 1989) 
1. Authorizations: 
a. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Committee on 
Foreign Affairs. 
b. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Committee on Foreign Relations. 
2. Appropriations 
a. House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations (Subcommittees 
on Foreign Operations and Defense). 
b. Senate Committee on Appropriations (Subcommittees on Foreign 
Operations and Defense). 
The Executive Branch's organizational structure is far more diverse. The management 
of security assistance encompasses the Departments of State, Treasury, Commerce, DoD, the 
Unified Commanders and the military departments. The Departments of Treasury and 
Commerce exercise authority over security assistance programs through their control 
measures to include export clearance and critical commodity controls. The key players, 
however, are the State Department and DoD. Figure 1 provides a depiction of the U.S. 
Government organization for Security Assistance. (DISAM, 1989) 
G. DOD ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE 
By law, the Secretary of State is responsible for the "continuous supervision and 
general direction" of the security assistance program (DoS Pub 8869, 1976). However, the 
Department of Defense has the largest supportive role of any Department or Office (e.g., 
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Departments of Defense, Treasury, Commerce, Office of Management and Budget, etc). As 
prescribed by the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act, the Secretary 
of Defense has the primary responsibility for: 
1. The determination of military end-item requirements; 
2. The procurement of military equipment in a manner which permits its integration 
with service programs; 
3. The supervision of end-item use by recipient countries; 
4. The supervision of the training of foreign military and related civilian personnel; 
5. The movement and delivery of military end-items; 
6. The establishment of priorities in the procurement, delivery and allocation of 
military equipment. 
7. Within the Department of Defense, the performance of any other functions with 
respect to the furnishing of military assistance, education, training, sales and 
guarantees. (DoDDir 5132.3, 1988) 
The Office of the Secretary of Defense accomplishes its responsibilities through the 
designation of various Under Secretary and Assistant Secretaries with duties and 
responsibilities associated with security assistance. These offices include the following: 
1. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. This official serves as the principal adviser 
and assistant to the Secretary of Defense for all matters concerned with the 
integration of Departmental plans and policies with overall national security 
objectives, and exercises direction, authority and control over the Director of the 
Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA). 
2. Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs). The office within 
the Defense Department charged with the responsibility for supervising security 
assistance programs for other non-NATO European countries is the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs (ASD/ISA). 
3. Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Policy). This office 
oversees DoD activities related to NATO and other European countries, including 
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supervision of associated security assistance programs, and directs and coordinates 
the technology transfer review process. 
4. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Production and Logistics). The major function of 
this office is to ensure that DoD logistics policy and procedures are effectively 
integrated with security assistance. It is the policy and procedural body for security 
assistance functional areas to include cooperative logistics supply support and 
international co-production agreements. 
5. Director, Defense Research and Engineering. This official assures considerations 
of rationalization, standardization and interoperability in security assistance programs 
with NATO allies, provides analysis of the risk of compromise of U.S. weapon 
systems and participates in the technology transfer review process. 
6. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). This office is responsible for the 
establishment of policy and procedures involving financial management, fiscal matters, 
accounting, pricing, auditing and international balance of payments related to security 
assistance. (DoDDir 5132.3, 1988) 
In general, the Office of the Secretary of Defense is charged with the promulgation 
of the executive level policies and procedures related to security assistance. To assist OSD, 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) is a key participant in the development and 
review of the security assistance programs. Aided by his Unified Commanders5, the CJCS, 
coordinates security assistance with U.S. military plans and programs, recommends selection, 
introduction or redistribution of weapons systems in and among recipient countries and 
determines the impact of security assistance programs on U.S. programs and defense 
readiness. (DoDDir 5132.3, 1988) 
At the grassroots level, under the command and supervision of their respective CINCs 
are the security assistance organizations (SAO). Charged with the responsibility of logistics, 
fiscal and contract administration management, the SAO maintains liaison with DOD 
components, appropriate elements of the U.S. Diplomatic Mission and the foreign defense 
5Five of the unified commands have responsibilities for the conduct of U.S. security 
assistance programs. They are the U.S. European Command, Pacific Command, Southern 
Command, Atlantic Command and the Central Command. 
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organization. The SAO is the U.S. agency that interacts with the foreign country on a day 
to day basis and is normally attached to the diplomatic mission either as a SAO or as part of 
a military advisory group (MAG). The SAOs are the hands-on organization within the 
security assistance bureaucracy. They are normally the initial recipient of a foreign country's 
request for security assistance, and oversee existing security assistance programs with the 
recipient country. (DISAM, 1989) 
H. FOREIGN MILITARY SALES PROCESS 
The focus of the security assistance program with any country is the cohesion of the 
U.S. and foreign purchaser's policy objectives. Any assistance provided by the U.S. must not 
only strengthen the recipient country's objectives, but more importantly strengthen our own 
national security and promote world peace. The commonality of objectives represents the 
first litmus test a potential foreign military sale must pass. Based on the nature of the request, 
the military department having cognizance over the defense article or service will normally 
receive a Letter of Request (LOR) from the foreign country through U.S. diplomatic 
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to day basis and is nonna ly a tached to the diplomatic mi sion either as a SAO or as part of 
a military advisory group (MAG). The SAOs are the hands-on organization within the 
security a sistance bureaucracy. They are nonna ly the initial recipient of a foreign country's 
request for security a sistance, and oversee existing security a sistance programs with the 
recipient country. (DISA , 1989) 
. F EI  il  S LES P S 
he foc s f the security assistance progra  ith any country is the cohesion f the 
. . a  f r i  rchaser's lic  jecti es.  assistance rovided  the . . st ot 
l  tr t e  t e r i ie t tr 's j ti es, t re i rta tly tre then r n 
ti l it   t  l  .  lit  f j ti s r r s ts t  
   i        , 
      nn
  
Figure 2 
'----'=c""us""'to=m"-'e:!.oolr'---...J~I u.s. Embassy In-Country !_ ti  
I izaDt  e t 
Secl>ef 
 
Request :lIoo I 
I
custo er Repre- r P 
L-. se_Da_tiv_e_iD_U_S_---'~ --------: COIDizaDt DoD CompoDeDt 






I DeptOfDefenae Department of State Bureau ofPoUtko-Military Affairs 
21 
. DSAA 
Channels. Figure 2 shows the channels for submissions of LORs. 
Once the LOR has been received by the military department, the request must be 
validated to ensure that the potential customer is an eligible FMS recipient, that the article or 
service sought may be sold and that the request has been received through proper channels. 
The Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) maintains a military articles and services 
list (MASL) which identifies the military articles and services eligible for FMS. If the item 
requested is not on the MASL, a policy level decision must be made. 
Provided the LOR has cleared the initial screening, the military department will draft 
a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) which will in turn be reviewed by the DSAA and 
initial approval provided by the Department of State. During the Department of State's 
review of the LOA Congress can also be notified of the impending sale. Although not a 
statutory requirement, it provides Congress with a 20 calendar day advance notification to 
allow for preliminary congressional examination. Once the 20 days has expired, DSAA 
submits the formal 30 day notification to Congress required by the Arms Export Control Act. 
The onus is upon Congress to act if it objects to the LOA. If Congress fails to object to the 
proposed sale within 30 days, the DSAA submits the LOA to the requesting government for 
its review and acceptance/rejection. (DoD 5105.38M, 1989) 
The means by which the U.S. Government fulfills its obligations of the FMS programs 
vary according to the article or service requested. In the instance of military articles, the 
requested item can be provided from military surplus or government stocks. For procurement 
items from new production, the FMS requirements may be consolidated with DoD 
requirements or contracted separately. 
I. SUMMARY 
This chapter has traced the history of security assistance from its early days during the 
revolutionary war to today. It has illustrated the evolution of our security assistance 
objectives and how they relate to our own national security objectives. Prior to World War 
II, with U.S. foreign policy characterized by an isolationist theme, security assistance was 
very limited and essentially oriented towards the Western Hemisphere as exhibited by the 
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Monroe Doctrine. The allied victory of World War II and the emergence of the U.S. and 
USSR as the world's superpowers saw the emphasis of security assistance shift to a global 
perspective. Designed to contain communism, U.S. aid to friendly and allied countries 
increased dramatically over the ensuing years and increasingly became a major component 
of our foreign policy. 
The conclusion of the Vietnam War, coupled with public sentiment at the time, 
compelled Congress to become an active participant in the implementation of U.S. foreign 
policy. Concerned with the U.S. becoming embroiled in "another Vietnam", Congress 
amended the Foreign Assistance Act and Arms Export Control Act, charging the Executive 
Branch with specific responsibilities to clarify its policy on arms assistance and to establish 
organizations to provide security assistance management. From this legislation, the Defense 
Security Assistance Agency was established, providing the bulwark of effort for DoD-related 
security assistance to foreign countries. 
Congressional interest and executive level scrutiny of security assistance related to 
sales of U.S. arms to foreign countries inevitably comes with a large degree of bureaucracy 
given the number of reviews necessary for a request to be approved. The recipient country 
cannot exercise the same degree of influence on weapons procurement as they could if the 
arms were produced in their country or if the contractual relationship was directly between 
themselves and the U.S. defense contractor. DoD has been interposed between the foreign 
country and the defense contractor, further complicating the acquisition process from the 
foreign country's perspective.   This relationship is not entirely beneficial for the foreign 
country. When combined with the institutional maze that a request must move through and 
the perceived dependence on the U.S. for defense articles, it provides the origins of the break 
from the traditional buyer - seller relationship and the desire for the recipient countries 
attempt to derive some additional benefit. Chapter m will discuss this new trade practice and 
the reactions from the Executive Branch, Congress and the defense industry. 
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m. OFFSETS, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, the origins of foreign military sales in the United States was 
traced from its roots during the Revolutionary War, where the fledgling U.S. Government 
was the recipient of French arms and supplies, to its current state. The theme that existed 
then, continues today that is, one of a common means, in the form of arms, used to 
accomplish different national objectives. The U.S. does not provide arms to foreign 
countries solely from an economic perspective. The foreign military sales process is founded 
on the assumption that U.S. military aid provides for regional stability and world peace, while 
improving a particular nation's self-defense capability. By investing in a foreign country's self- 
defense capability, the U.S. benefits by having an allied or friendly country as a stabilizing 
force in various regions of the world. 
Similar to France's motives in the Revolutionary War, the U.S. motives are not 
altruistic. Our motives serve our national security interests. The benefits derived are also not 
necessarily equal in value. The recipient country may receive relatively modern defense 
material; however, it does not contribute to their economic well-being on the same scale as 
it does the U.S. 
From this imbalance of benefits comes the idea of offsets. Essentially, offset 
agreements are between a foreign country and a U.S. defense company which is in contrast 
to the traditional foreign government to U.S. Government relationship associated with FMS. 
They are designed to do exactly what the name implies, i.e., offset the cost of the sale in some 
direct or indirect form that is beneficial to the recipient. The seller is compelled by the buyer 
to enter into a compensating or reciprocal relationship. This condition is referred to as 
countertrade for civilian goods, but when the sale is of a military nature, offset is the accepted 
term. 
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Offsets are a range of industrial or commercial compensations required as a condition 
of purchase in either government to government or commercial sales of defense articles 
and/or defense services as defined by the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and the 
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). The different types of offsets are: 
1. Coproduction: Overseas production based upon a government to government 
agreement that permits a foreign government or producer(s) to acquire the technical 
information to manufacture all or part of a U.S. origin defense article. 
2. Licensed Production. Overseas production of a U.S. origin defense article based 
on transfer of technical information under direct commercial arrangements between 
a U.S. manufacturer and a foreign government or producer. 
3. Subcontractor production. Overseas production of a part or component of a U.S. 
origin defense article. 
4. Overseas Investment. Investment arising from the offset agreement, taking the 
form of capital invested to establish or expand a subsidiary or joint venture in the 
foreign country. 
5. Technology Transfer. Transfer of technology that occurs as a result of an offset 
agreement and that may take the form of research and development conducted 
abroad, technical assistance or other activities under direct commercial arrangement 
between the U.S. manufacturer and a foreign entity. 
6. Countertrade. An agreement involving the reciprocal purchase of civil or defense 
goods and services from the foreign entity as a condition of sale of military-related 
exports. 
7. Counterpurchase. An agreement by the initial exporter to buy (or find a buyer for) 
a specified value of unrelated goods from the original importer during a specified time 
period. 
8. Compensation. An agreement by the original exporter to accept as full or partial 
repayment goods derived from the original exported product (e.g., turnkey factory, 
machinery or equipment used to produce military articles). Agreements for repayment 







Within the arms industry, offsets associated with military exports are frequently divided into 
direct and indirect classes. 
1. Direct Offsets.   Contractual arrangements that involve goods and services 
referenced in the sales agreement for military exports. 
2. Indirect Offsets.   Contractual arrangements that involve goods and services 
unrelated to the exports referenced in the sales agreement. 
Offsets result from a number of economic, political and security considerations on the 
part of the buyer. One of the first government-to-government agreements involving offsets 
was that of Norway for an FMS purchase of the TOW missile system and tracked vehicles in 
1968. The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) placed the primary burden on DoD to 
offset 25 percent ($50 million) of Norway's $200 million purchase (DISAM, 1989). Similar 
agreements with the United Kingdom, Australia and the Swiss government were entered into 
by DoD. Although the minimum offset targets were met in each case, difficulties encountered 
by DoD, as well as the increased pressure allies were bringing to bear for offsets, led to the 
1978 Duncan Memorandum, specifying that DoD would not be a party to satisfy 
commitments for offsets or compensatory coproduction. 
The Duncan Memorandum, issued by then Deputy Secretary of Defense Charles 
Duncan, established the guiding principles for what was to become U.S. policy on offsets. 
The memorandum stated: 
Because of the inherent difficulties in negotiating and implementing 
compensatory coproduction and offset agreements and the economic 
efficiencies they often entail, DoD shall not normally enter into such 
agreements. An exception will be made only when there is no feasible 
alternative to ensure the successful completion of transactions considered to 
be of significant importance to the United States national security interests. 
(DISAM, 1989) 
The basic policy in the Security Assistance Management Manual published by the 
Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) puts the basic policy this way: 
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It is DoD policy not to enter into government-to-government offset 
arrangements because of the inherent difficulties in negotiating and 
implementing such arrangements. Any foreign government requesting offset 
should be informed that the responsibility for negotiating any offset 
arrangements reside with the U.S. contractor involved. The U.S. Government 
will not commit a U.S. contractor to an offset commitment without having its 
prior concurrence. (SAMM, 1988) 
An example of a program governed by this policy is the Canadian F/A-18 
procurement. In this program, McDonnel Douglas granted nearly 100 percent offsets, 
including coproduction (direct offset), establishment of non-F/A-18 related industrial 
capabilities in Canada and marketing of Canadian goods and services (indirect offsets). Even 
though DoD was not directly involved in the offset package or the sale, the U.S. Navy F/A-18 
program derived production cost reductions in their own procurements6 and the U.S. security 
interests were strongly served by Canadian acquisition of this high performance aircraft for 
use in North American air defense.(DISAM, 1989) 
C. CONGRESSIONAL CONCERNS - IMPACT OF OFFSETS 
The increasing number of offset and countertrade arrangements did not go unnoticed 
by Congress. Concerned with the potential political impact that this trade practice could 
have on the competitive position of U.S. industries, congressional hearings were held and 
studies by the General Accounting Office requested to evaluate the influence offsets in foreign 
military sales (FMS) had on the defense industrial base. In a July 1985 report on this issue, 
following a hearing by the Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization of the House Committee 
on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, the following concerns were registered: 
Increasingly, such arrangements are required by foreign buyers as a condition 
of the sale in order to counter or offset the economic impact of the sale on the 
costs across 
of scales 
6The Canadian F/A-18 procurement allowed McDonnel Douglas to allocate their overhead 
 the Canadian contract, as well as the U.S. Navy Contract, thus achieving economies 
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purchasing country. These arrangements take many specific forms, including 
requiring subcontracting to firms in the purchasing country, coproduction of 
certain items, technology transfer or the purchase of goods from the buyer 
country by the U.S. seller. 
While the specific mechanisms differ, the purpose is the same: to help the 
economy of the purchasing country, its industrial base, its employment, and 
its balance of payments. It is increasingly apparent that the impact on our 
own industrial base, our own employment, our own balance of payments and 
ultimately, the competitive position of our industries is substantial. 
The House of Representatives appeared to take the lead on this issue, due primarily 
to their smaller constituency and districts where subcontractors, more apt to feel the effects 
of offset agreements, are located. In 1984, the House passed a bill that became an 
amendment to the Defense Production Act (PL 98-265) requiring the President to report 
annually on the impact of offsets on U.S. defense preparedness, industrial competitiveness, 
employment and trade. Section 309 of the Defense Production Act (DPA) amendments of 
1984 were approved on 17 Apr 1984 and read: 
Not later than 18 months after the date of the enactment of the Defense 
Production Act amendments of 1984, and annually thereafter, the President 
shall submit...a report on the impact of offsets on the defense preparedness, 
industrial competitiveness, employment and trade of the United States. Such 
report also shall include a discussion of bilateral and multilateral negotiations 
on offsets in international procurement and provide information on the types, 
terms and magnitude of the offsets. 
The conferees intend that information provided on terms, types and magnitude 
of the offsets in each report shall include the number of relevant offset 
agreements required by contract, the total dollar amount of the value of 
offsets required by such contracts, a breakdown of offsets by category of 
defense material or defense services involved in such contracts, and a 
breakdown of such offsets by recipient countries. 
In addition, each report shall contain a summary of relevant Memoranda of 
Understanding between the United States and foreign countries which provide 
the official framework within which foreign offset commitments incurred in 
private sales can be fulfilled. Copies of actual Memoranda of Understanding 
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involving such offsets shall be made available to the House and Senate 
Banking Committees upon request, after each report has been submitted by 
the President. (DISAM, 1989) 
Subsequent congressional action came in the form of the National Defense 
Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989 (NDAA 89). Section 825 of this Act restated concerns 
regarding the impact offsets could have on the U.S. defense industrial base, the transfer of 
U.S. technology abroad and the possible undermining of U.S. contractors and subcontractors' 
competitive edge. Additionally, Section 825 of the NDAA 89 amended Title 10 by adding 
Section 2505 to Chapter 148 of Title 10, United States Code. The essence of this amendment 
was to press the President of the United States to "...establish a comprehensive policy with 
respect to contractual offset arrangements in connection with the purchase of defense 
equipment or supplies..." (OMB, 1990). This amendment addressed the issues of technology 
transfer in connection with offset arrangements, the effects of these arrangements on specific 
subsectors of the industrial base of the United States. It required the President to enter into 
negotiations with foreign countries that have a policy of requiring offset arrangements in 
connection with the purchase of defense equipment or supplies from the United States to 
achieve an agreement to limit the adverse effects such arrangements have on the defense 
industrial base of each such country. Lastly, Section 2505 required that the President submit 
a comprehensive report to Congress addressing the following points: 
1. An analysis of the amount and type of contractual offsets required of United States 
firms by the governments of foreign countries or by foreign firms. 
2. An assessment of the benefits for and costs to United States manufacturers of 
defense products at all tiers that result from requirements of foreign governments for 
contractual offset arrangements in the case of products procured from United States 
firms. 
3. An assessment of the benefits for and the cost to United States manufacturers of 
defense products at all tiers that would result from restrictions of the ability of foreign 
governments or foreign firms to require contractual offsets in the case of defense 
products procured from United States firms. 
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4. An assessment of the benefits and costs of a United States policy that requires 
reciprocal offsets in the procurement of defense products from those countries whose 
governments have a policy of requiring contractual offsets in the case of defense 
products procured from United States firms. 
5. An assessment of the impact that elimination of contractual offset requirements in 
international sales of defense products would have on the national security of the 
United States. 
6. Recommendations for a national policy with respect to contractual offset 
arrangements. (OMB, 1989) 
Congress has taken distinct and visible steps towards possible legislation to mitigate 
the effects of offset arrangements. Designed primarily to analyze their impact, Congress very 
clearly signaled to the Executive Branch their interest in this subject area and their intent to 
act if the Executive Branch did not establish measures to limit the debilitating effects offset 
arrangements can have. This intent was clearly demonstrated in congressional hearings where 
Congressmen espoused the need for statutes prohibiting offsets arrangements as a condition 
of a FMS. The Honorable Barbara Kennelly, Representative in Congress from the State of 
Connecticut introduced a bill, H.R. 1652, in March, 1987 calling for the President to enter 
into bilateral or multilateral negotiations with appropriate foreign governments for the 
purpose of disciplining direct and indirect offset conditions. The intent of the bill was to form 
an alliance of countries who provide offsets to counter the ongoing abuses in the offset 
system. (Kennelly, 1987)7 
The congressional testimony and general feeling of Congress sent warning signals 
throughout the U.S. defense industry, who mobilized their own lobbying forces to temper any 
such action. 
7H.R. 1652 was not passed by Congress; however, similar language requiring the 
President to enter into bilateral or multilateral negotiations was included in the NDAA, FY89. 
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D. DEFENSE INDUSTRY REACTION 
The actions of Congress preceding the enactment of the amendments to the DPA were 
of visible concern to the top defense contractors in the United States. Their concern 
originated from the possibility that if Congress passed legislation prohibiting offset 
arrangements, such laws would place the contractors at a disadvantage when selling their 
wares to foreign countries. Long viewed as just a part of doing business in the international 
arms market, defense contractors realized that offsets can be a crucial element in making the 
sale. In the words of Richard Albrecht, executive vice president of Boeing,"... 60 percent 
of something is better than 100 percent of nothing" (Johnson, 1990). Mr. Albrecht's 
statement illustrates the simple truth that in the competitive world arms market, if one 
company is willing to make concessions, other companies will have to, unless their product 
is so unique that they have no other competition. 
In today's competitive markets, the United States has strong competitors for most 
U.S. products. In the defense arena, specifically, U.S. sales of defense equipment in the 
international market has declined over the past 10 years.(Johnson, 1987) This decline can 
be attributed to a reduction in arms purchases not only in the U.S., but in most of the 
developed countries in the world. Despite a decrease in demand, additional suppliers have 
emerged in the marketplace. Traditional competitors such as the former Soviet Union, France 
and the United Kingdom have been joined by Israel, Brazil, Italy and Spain, all vying for a 
greater market share. From the defense industry's perspective, the issues is not whether to 
accept a deal with or without offsets. The question, given the current competitive 
international environment, is between business with offsets or no business at all. (Johnson, 
1987). 
Much of the conflict over offsets is the concern that U.S. defense companies are 
accepting offsets irrespective of their implications on the U.S. economy. These defense 
companies do, after all, exercise a considerable degree of control over the offsets they accept. 
A company only makes or accepts offers which will leave it better off than it would have been 
without the business. This control extends into the technology or subcontracting work 
transferred to a foreign country. U.S. defense companies are very sensitive to the fact that 
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by transferring "state of the art" technology or manufacturing "know-how" abroad they 
undermine their own competitive position. These types of transfers are very popular offset 
objectives of foreign countries intent on improving their own self-sufficiency. U.S. companies 
recognize the long-term consequences of this practice and will only enter into such 
agreements when they have something even better in the development stage for near-term 
incorporation into the production process. 
The term U.S. defense company has a broad definition and perhaps requires 
clarification. In the arena of offset agreements, the defense companies most affected are those 
that are prime contractors, top tier corporations that develop, produce and sell weapon 
systems to the U.S. and foreign countries. Companies such as Boeing, McDonnel Douglas, 
Lockheed and General Dynamics are all active participants in the offset environment. While 
they actively participate in the development of and agreement to offset provisions, they are 
not likely to be on the receiving end of the offset agreements. As stated previously, the large 
defense companies will not agree to offset provisions that leave them worse off than they 
were. Requirements to produce a portion of a weapon system offshore must cost less than 
it would to produce in the U.S. or be compensated for in the price of the contract. Indirect 
offset requirements such as selling a recipient countries exports in the U.S. must adhere to 
sound business practices. The prime defense contractors will not be caught with the short end 
of the stick, this does not necessarily mean that a lower tier U.S. defense subcontractor is not 
worse off. 
From an macroeconomic perspective, the U.S. defense companies contend that sales 
with associated offsets are on balance favorable for the U.S. economy. This conclusion is 
in agreement the other studies by the International Trade Commission and the Office of 
Management of Budget to be discussed later in this chapter. They also point out in the macro 
sense that for every export, at some time from some place there must be an import of equal 
value. While offsets seem to specify the product and the country, it does not change the 
overall economic requirement that exports and imports must balance over the long run. 
In their examination of microeconomic areas such as employment, technology transfer 
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and erosion of the industrial base, the U.S. defense companies generally argue that there is 
not, overall, an adverse effect attributable to offsets. While an offset agreement requiring a 
certain portion of subcontracting work be performed in the recipient country does in fact cost 
U.S. jobs, if not for the offset agreement the sale would have likely gone to an overseas 
producer, and no work would have been created in the United States. By sacrificing some 
U.S. jobs, they were able to retain others. In the area of technology transfer and aiding their 
future competition, the U.S. defense companies fall back on their previous assertion that their 
focus is not the protection of current technology but rather in the development of more 
advance technology. Defense companies also note that the vast bulk of process-technology 
transfer occurs through normal commercial transactions, not through offsets (Johnson, 1987). 
Companies that specialize in manufacturing not only build facilities in the U.S. but also 
abroad. Through these transactions then, the U.S. encourages the export of machine tools 
to aid other countries ability to manufacture goods that ultimately compete with U.S. goods. 
U.S. defense companies recognize that offsets are an aberration of the free market 
system but no more than any other distortion to the market caused by subsidized export 
credits, tariffs and import restrictions. They are all a departure from the perfect world where 
two variables, quality of the product and its price, determine the success or failure of a 
product. Offsets are nothing more than the countertrade practices that have been prevalent 
in the commercial marketplace. Rebates, low interest financing and special option packages 
are all examples of "offsets" expected by consumers when contemplating a major purchase. 
Such is the case with foreign countries. Confronted with a purchase with taxpayers' funds of 
expensive, highly visible foreign products that are a major burden on the country's economy, 
governments are inclined to demonstrate to the public that they have obtained the best 
possible deal in the terms of price, jobs, sales of domestic products and technology transfer. 
This position is not unlike certain U.S. Government requirements. While we do not 
make formal offset demands, DoD generally requires that any major defense system bought 
from offshore suppliers ultimately be manufactured in the U.S. In the case of the M9 9mm 
pistol purchased by U.S. Army from the Italian manufacturer Beretta, the contract required 
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that the technology to manufacture the pistol be transferred to the U.S. in three phases. 
During the first year of operations, fully completed pistols would be imported from Italy. In 
the second year, all assembly and testing would be done in the U.S.. During the third year, 
the frame, slide and barrels would be manufactured in the U.S. As a result, during the five 
years of this contract, approximately 66 percent of the value of the contract came to U.S. 
industry. (OMB, 1986) DoD's requirement is justified on national security grounds, 
however, from the viewpoint of the foreign supplier it appears to be an offset requirement. 
The defense industry's concern regarding offset legislation stems from fear that any 
legislation aimed at countering such practices would simply result in the customer turning to 
another supplier who is not encumbered by offset restrictions. While they oppose the U.S. 
Government adopting unilateral provisions restricting offset agreements, they endorse steps 
taken in a bilateral or multilateral fashion. Their recommendations obviously originate from 
their desire to compete in the marketplace and long term survival, but they found an ally 
within the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government, whose motivation was not a profit and 
loss statement but one of national security and its responsibilities as a world superpower. 
E. EXECUTIVE BRANCH POLICIES 
The Duncan memorandum, described above, became the basis for U.S. policy 
regarding offsets until the passing of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1989. With 
this Act, Congress established a statutory requirement to publish a policy on offsets in 
military exports. Since the Reagan administration was coming to a close, the policy 
requirement was passed to the incoming Bush administration. Headed by General Scowcroft, 
President Bush's national security advisor, a National Security Council ad hoc working group8 
was chartered to prepare an appropriate policy statement. This interagency working group 
solicited comments from defense industry and other groups, completing its work on 5 Mar 
1990.   President Bush's policy was announced on 16 Apr 1990, it read in part: 
"The interagency working group was comprised of representatives from the Departments 
of State, Defense, Labor, Commerce and Treasury. 
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No agency of the U.S. Government shall encourage, enter directly into, or 
commit U.S. firms to any offset arrangements in connection with the sale of 
defense goods or services to foreign governments. 
U S Government funds shall not be used to finance offsets in security 
assistance transactions except in accordance with currently established policies 
and procedures. 
Nothing in this policy shall prevent agencies of the U.S. Government from 
fulfilling obligations incurred through international agreements entered into 
prior to the issuance of this policy. 
The decision whether to engage in offsets, and the responsibility for 
negotiating and implementing offset arrangements, resides with the companies 
involved. 
Any exception to this policy must be approved by the President through the 
National Security Council. 
The President also noted that the time has come to consult with our friends 
and allies regarding the use of offsets in defense procurement. He has, 
therefore directed the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the 
Secretary of State, to lead an interagency team to consult with foreign nations 
with a view to limiting the adverse effects of offsets in defense procurement. 
This interagency team will report periodically on the results of these 
consultations and forward any recommendations to the National Security 
Council. (OMB, 1990) 
President Bush's policy on offsets did not change how the Executive Branch viewed 
offsets and arms transfer policies from the previous administration. This continuity continues. 
Deputy head of Export Control Policy in the Department of State George Gowan indicated 
that the new U.S. Conventional Arms Transfer policy, to be signed by President Clinton, is 
not expected to deviate from that of former Presidents Reagan and Bush. (Defense News, 24- 
30 Oct 1994). 
In the context of the U.S. arms transfer policy, the Executive Branch views offsets 
as an economically inefficient irritant. However, they are a marketing technique and a form 
of export financing. Realizing that the government making the arms purchase has objectives 
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beyond procuring arms at a cost effective price such as political acceptability, the maintenance 
of domestic defense and commercial industries and preserving foreign exchange, it follows 
that the United States arms export and offset policies have considerations influenced by 
foreign policy/national security concerns that may conflict with economic efficiency. 
Arms transfers, including in some cases offset agreements, enhance the preparedness 
of allies and friends by providing them with the tools to defend themselves. Cooperative 
agreements, coproduction and licensed production contribute to our allied preparedness by 
enhancing their allies ability to contribute the productive capacity of the alliance. This 
rationale has been used extensively throughout the NATO alliance. 
Arm transfers, when combined with basing or access rights for U.S. forces on foreign 
soil, facilitate U.S. power projection capabilities. Offsets can indirectly contribute to this 
capability. If the offset provisions were not agreed to, the sale or transfer of arms would not 
have occured,thereby denying the U.S. possible access rights. 
Coproduction and licensed production offset agreements promote rationalization, 
standardization and interoperability with our allies by providing for the use of a common 
weapon systems. These types of agreements provide our allies with incentives to standardize 
common systems, and enhance the ability of allies to maintain and support the systems of 
other alliance members. 
Offsets directly contribute to foreign sales, but also reduce the cost of DoD purchases 
by allowing U.S. producers to allocate overhead costs across a large base, thus contributing 
to economies of scale. The additional business also enhances the overall health of the U.S. 
defense industrial base. 
The previous paragraphs discuss the prevailing views of the Executive branch 
regarding the benefits of an arms transfer policy and clearly illustrate how they traditionally 
emphasize the foreign policy and national security aspects over some U.S. economic 
concerns. As a consequence, the emerging mood within Congress concerning the adverse 
effects of offsets, coupled with their view that the development of foreign policy was not 
solely the domain of the President, the Executive Branch was increasingly required to defend 
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IV. OFFSETS IN MILITARY EXPORTS, THE OMB STUDY 
This chapter will summarize the information contained in the fifth annual report 
required by Section 309 of the Defense Production Act (DPA) and the National Defense 
Authorization Act of FY89 (NDAA89).9   This report was prepared by a staff level 
interagency committee chaired by OMB and comprised of members from the Departments 
of Commerce, Defense, Labor, State and Treasury as well as the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, the Council of Economic Advisers, the National Security Council, the United States 
Trade Representative and the Office of Management and Budget. This interagency committee 
adopted the informal title of coordinating committee and will be referred to as such in this 
chapter.   The fifth annual report on offsets in military exports was selected because it is 
perhaps the most comprehensive macro report available on the issue of offsets and is the basis 
supporting many of the statements regarding their effects from the defense industry. 
A. BACKGROUND 
The database on offsets in military exports, developed for the purposes of the study, 
included not only the information they obtained in 1988 but also that compiled as a result of 
the 1985 study. Both databases were the result of information obtained from U.S. defense 
contractors solicited by government questionnaires. Due to some misgivings reported by 
GAO in their 1985 study, in June 1987, the coordinating committee began work on a new 
survey questionnaire. At a meeting of the Defense Industry Offset Association in October 
1987, industry representatives were allowed to review and comment on the draft survey 
instrument. The final questionnaire was mailed to industry on August 23, 1988. 
The survey requested information on military export sales contracts signed between 
9The majority of the information contained in this chapter is drawn from the 1990 OMB study 
on offsets in military exports. The source for the data presented is the OMB study unless 
otherwise noted. 
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January 1, 1980 and December 31, 1987, valued at over $500,000 and that involved an offset 
agreement. The questionnaire was sent to 52 corporations selected by the coordinating 
committee from the top 100 DoD contractors.10 Of the corporations solicited, 36 reported 
one or more qualifying contracts. In an effort to verify the accuracy and extent of the survey's 
coverage, the defense companies were also requested to provide information on all military 
export sales with or without offset obligations. This information was compared with data 
provided by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) used in its annual World 
Military Expenditures and Arms Transfer report. Table 1 illustrates that approximately 93 
percent of all U.S. military exports were accounted for by the survey. 
Value of Military Export Agreements, 1980 -1987 
(Billions of Dollars) 
Source 1980   198J.   1982   1983    1984    1985    1986   1987 Total 
ACDA
 6.4       8.5       9.3      11.6     10.6     12.3      NA      NA    78.9 
Survey 6.5       8.0      9.0      8.9      9.3      10.7     10.7     10.5    73.6 
Survey % of ACDA     102       94       97       77       88        87       NA     NA    NA 
NA - not available 
Source: OMB, Dec 1990 
Table 1 
Given the high percentage of arms exports captured by the survey, the coordinating 
committee was confident that a similar if not higher percentage of offset agreements was also 
captured. 
It is interesting to note that one of the GAO's misgivings concerning the 1985 offset study 
was that the subcontractors, who were most likely to feel the effects of offsets, were 
unrepresented. In the 1990 study this fact reappears and will be discussed in Chapter V. 
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January 1, 1980 and December 31, 1987, valued at over $50 ,0  and that involved an of set 
agre ment. The question aire was sent to 52 corporations selected by the co rdinating 
commit e  from the top 10  DoD contractors. lO Of the corporations solicited, 36 reported 
one or more qualifying contracts. In an ef ort to verify the ac uracy and extent of the survey's 
coverage, the defense companies were also requested to provide information on al  military 
export sales with or without of set obligations. This infor ation was co pared with data 
provided by the r s Control and isar a ent gency ( C ) used in its annual orld 
ilitary Expenditures and r s ransfer report. able 1 il ustrates that approxi ately 93 
perce t f al  . . ilitary exports er  acco te  for by t e survey. 
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Table 1 
i  t e i  ercentage f ar s e rts ca tured y the s r ey, the c r inating 
co i tee as confident that a si ilar if not higher percentage f offset agree ents as also 
captured. 
10 It is interesting to note that one of the GAO's misgivings concerning the 1985 o fset study 
was that the subcontractors, who were most likely to feel the e fects of o fsets, were 
unrepresented. In the 1990 study this fact reappears and wi l be discu sed in Chapter V. 
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B. GENERAL SURVEY RESULTS 
The results of their survey were a database that consisted of 336 separate sales and 
their associated offset obligations. For the 8 years covered by the survey , contracts with 
offset agreements totaled $35.0 billion and involved 30 different countries or country groups. 
Three countries, Israel, Canada and Australia, along with the European Participating Group 
(EPG)11 accounted for over half of the total value. The offset agreements associated with 
these contracts were valued at $20.1 billion or 57 percent of the sales value. 
Military Export Sales Contracts and Associated Offset Obligations by Country 
1980 - 1987 (Millions of Dollars) 
Value of Export Value of Offset Offset Obligations 
Country Sales Contracts Obligations Percentage of Sales 
Australia 3,434.4 1,276.2 37.6 
Belgium 389.1 336.3 86.4 
Canada 3,890.1 3,035.1 78.0 
Egypt 383.0 87.8 22.9 
Euro Participating Group 5,219.0 2,209.9 42.3 
Federal Republic Germany 1,328.8 792.3 59.6 
Greece 850.2 332.0 39.1 
Israel 6,095.0 1,399.4 23.0 
NATO Group 667.4 320.4 48.0 
Netherlands 821.8 512.6 62.4 
Republic of Korea 1,056.8 488.0 46.2 
Singapore 511.5 153.1 29.9 
Spain 2,151.3 2,851.1 132.5 
Sweden 381.7 667.7 174.9 
Switzerland 370.9 248.5 67.0 
Turkey 2,701.7 1,583.1 58.6 
United Kingdom 1,878.2 2,014.7 107.3 
All others 2.842.8 1.775.7 62.5 
Totals 34,973.3 20,084.1 57.4 
Source: OMB, 1990 
Table 2 
"The European Participating Group is a consortium comprised of Belgium, Denmark, Norway 
and the Netherlands. 
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Table 2 above lists the countries that were the recipients of these sales contracts and the 
value of the offset agreement as a percentage. Once again Australia, Israel, Canada and the 
EPG, joined by Turkey and Spain, accounted for about 72 percent of the offset obligations. 
The survey also used the Standard Industry Classification (SIC) system to collect 
information on the types of goods and services covered by the offset agreements. Table 3 
provides the results of the offset obligations classified by SIC. 
Value of Offset Obligation by SIC 













Source: OMB, 1990 
Table 3 
Industry Description Value 
Electronic Components 394.7 
All other 190.5 
Subtotal Electric and other Elctrc Eqpt 585.2 
Aircraft 709.0 
Aircraft Engines and Engine Parts 1,767.7 
Aircraft Parts and Equipment 4,391.7 
All other 103.9 
Subtotal Transportation Equipment 6,972.3 
Search and Navigation Equipment 1,998.6 
All other 228.3 
Subtotal Instruments 2,226.9 
Other Manufacturing Industries 345.7 
Subtotal all Manufacturing 10,130.1 
Nonmanufacturing 73.9 
Not classified 9.880.1 
Total all offset products 20,084.1 
The defense industry firms reported for approximately one half of the offset 
obligations, the types of goods and services were not determined at the time of the survey's 
distribution and consequently could not be classified. For the remaining offset obligations, 
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the vast majority was accounted for in manufactured goods, predominately aircraft engines 
and engine parts (SIC 3724), aircraft parts and equipment (SIC 3278) and radar and related 
navigational equipment (SIC 3812). The survey results were also categorized according to 
the type of offset and whether they were direct or indirect. Table 4 shows the value of the 
offset obligations according to this breakdown. 
Value of Offset Obligations by Type of Offset 
1980 - 1987 (Millions of Dollars) 
Type of Offset Obligations 
Direct Offsets 
Coproduction 3,093.9 
Licensed Production 508.8 
Subcontractor Production 3,412.3 
Overseas Investment 30.1 
Technology Transfer 149.7 
Countertrade (Buybacks) 9. l 
Not specified 151.0 
Subtotal Direct Offsets 7,354.9 
Indirect Offsets 
Coproduction 22.7 
Licensed Production 70.0 
Subcontractor Production 3,931.3 
Overseas Investment 486.2 
Technology Transfer 29.3 
Countertrade (Buybacks) 1,533.4 
Not specified 2.284.8 
Subtotal Indirect Offsets 8,357.7 
Not known offset 4,371.4 
Total all types 20,084.1 
Source: OMB, 1990 
Table 4 
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C. DEFENSE PREPAREDNESS AND INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS 
In their attempt to assess the impact offsets have in the area of defense preparedness 
and industrial competitiveness, the coordinating committee viewed both areas to have 
extensive overlap and combined their analysis. 
A relevant measure of the impact of offsets on defense preparedness and industrial 
competitiveness have is the net economic benefits or costs derived from the military export 
sales that occur in the principal sectors of the economy that support the national defense. The 
coordinating committee defined the "defense sectors" as those sectors of the economy with 
10 percent or more of the total 1987 output sold directly or indirectly for defense purposes. 
To derive the net economic impacts of sales and their associated offsets, the Data 
Resources Incorporated (DRI) Interindustry Model of the United States economy was 
adopted by the coordinating committee. This model is based on the 1977 input-output table 
prepared by the Department of Commerce, with interindustry and final demand relationships 
updated through 1981. The model divides the economy into 425 sectors down to the four 
digit SIC level of detail Through this model, it is possible to determine the direct and indirect 
impacts on output that a particular sale has on its own sector, as well as secondary or indirect 
impacts on output that a sale has on other sectors, (e.g., the impact an aircraft engine sale has 
on the aircraft engine sector as well as the semiconductor sector). These indirect impacts 
occur as direct impacts filter through the economy, affecting transaction flows among buying 
and selling industries. Industries that are not directly affected by sales and offsets may be 
indirectly affected by virtue of their position as suppliers to the industries that are being 
directly affected.   The DRI model provides an estimate of the total impact on industrial 
output, which is the sum of both the direct and indirect impacts. (OMB, 1990) 
The coordinating committee, using the DRI model and the data obtained from the 
1988 survey, was able to calculate three sets of direct and indirect industry impacts. 
1. Impacts resulting only from the actual billings of military export sales. 
2. Impacts resulting only from the contribution of offset implementations tied to 
offset obligations. 
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3.  Impacts resulting from the net effects of billings for military exports and their 
associated implement offsets. 
Their analysis assumed that the impact of billings for military exports is always 
positive. In other words, billings always result in positive output for those industries affected. 
This approach assumes that for every billing in a given industrial sector, there was a 
corresponding increase in final demand that is met by output of a U.S. industry. They 
recognized that some of the output associated with a given billing may occur offshore, which 
tended to overstate the positive impacts of billings. 
Offset implementations were interpreted as foregone production opportunities which 
resulted in negative output for those industries affected. This interpretation overstated the 
negative effects of offsets because not all offsets involve transfer of industry output to another 
country. This interpretation of the negative effects was viewed as having a balancing 
influence regarding their assumption on billings. 
Defining a one percentage change in output as significant, the coordinating 
committee's analysis showed only four sectors experienced a significant net positive average 
annual impact on output and only one sector experienced a net negative average annual 
impact as a result of the direct effects of sales and offsets. Table 5 shows the cumulative 
effects on the top 25 defense sectors and non-defense sectors due to offsets. 
The conclusions the coordinating committee drew from this data were that even under 
the assumptions that exaggerated the effects of billings and offsets, military exports and their 
associated offsets play only a minor role in terms of the overall output of defense and non- 
defense industries. Where they do have an effect, they generally result in net increases in 
output in the most technologically advanced sectors. In the Engineering and Scientific 
Instruments sector, which includes high technology fire control, search, navigation, guidance 
and other avionics systems used in aircraft, the survey reported a net average annual increase 
in output of 8.6 percent. By investing $1.7 million in the form of offsets, U.S. industrial 
output in that sector benefitted by $3.2 million. 
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Cumulative Direct and Indirect Effects of Sales and Offsets 1980-1987 on the Top 25 
Defense and Other Significantly Affected Industrial Sectors 
Industry Title 
Eng & Scientific Inst 
Other Ordnance & Access 
Aircraft 
Aircraft Engines & Parts 
NonFer Forgings 
Complete Guided Missiles 
Radio & TV Coram Equip 
Steam Engines & Turbines 
Resistors 





Iron & Steel Forgings 
Elec Measuring Instr 
Optical Instr & Lenses 
Primary Nonfer Metals 
Other Business Services 
Explosives 
Maint and Repair, Public 
Industrial Trucks & Tractors 
Ammunition Small Arms 
Elec Equip 
Machine Tools, Metal 
Surgical & Medical Instr 
Shipbuilding & Repairing 
Measuring & Control Inst 
Machine Tools, Cutting 
Footwear, Cut Stock 
Aircraft Parts & Equip 
Source: OMB, 1990 
Table 5 
Total Output Impact 
(Millions of 1989 Dollars) 
Net         Sales         Offset 
Average Annual 
Output Impact 
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38 64 -     25 0.4% 0.7% -0.3% 
163 178 -     15 0.4% 0.4% -0.0% 
30 49 -     19 0.4% 0.6% -0.2% 
47 78 -     31 0.4% 0.6% -0.2% 
38 78 -     40 0.3% 0.6% -0.3% 
61 70 9 0.2% 0.2% -0.0% 
53 164 -   Ill 0.2% 0.6% -0.4% 
108 205 -     96 0.2% 0.3% -0.1% 
59 118 -     59 0.1% 0.2% -0.1% 
11 90 -     79 0.1% 0.5% -0.4% 
96 234 -   138 0.0% 0.0% -0.0% 
.4 5 -      5 0.0% 0.1% -0.1% 
4 13 -      9 0.0% 0.0% -0.0% 
-2 2 -      4 0.0% 0.0% -0.0% 
-1 0 -      1 0.0% 0.0% -0.0% 
2 39 -     37 0.0% 0.3% -0.3% 
-6 8 -     14 -0.1% 0.1% -0.2% 
-33 0 -     33 -0.1% 0.0% -0.1% 
-68 1 -     69 -0.1% 0.0% -0.1% 
-135 132 -   267 -0.1% 0.1% -0.2% 
-40 31 -     71 -0.2% 0.1% -0.3% 
-15 0 -     15 -0.9% 0.0% -0.9% 
-2,088 2,683 - 4,772 -1.2% 1.5% -2.7% 
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Cumulative Direct and Indirect E fects of Sales and O fsets 1980-1987 on the Top 25 
Defense and Other Significantly A fected Industrial Sectors 
Total Output Impact Average Annual 
( i lions of 1989 o lars) utput I pact 
et Sales ffset et Sales ffset 
Industry itle Effect Effect Effect Effect Effect Effect 
ng  cientific Inst 3,245 4,971 -1,726 8.6  3.5  -4.8  
ther rdnance  ccess 766 , 41 275 3.8  .2  -1.4  
ircraft , 8 , 5 
-
7 3.5  3.6  -0.1  
ircraft ines  arts , 97 , 95 - ,797 .  .9  -1.2  
er r i s    .  .  -0.7  
l t  i  issil s    .  .  -0.0  
a i    m  i  ,  ,  
-
 .  .  -0.1  
t  i s  r i s    .  .  -0.2  
esistors   .  .  -0.3  
s   ts  .  .  -0.0  
S all r s  .  .  -0.2  
lectr ic a acit rs .  - .  
fer asti s .  .  -0.3  
iti  .  -0.0  
Ir   t l r i s 111 .  -0.4  
l  s ri  I str .  .  -0.1  
ti l I str  s s .  .  -0.1  
ri r  f r t ls .  -0.4  
t r si ss r i s 
-
.  -0.0  
xplosives . .  .  - .  
ai t a  e air, lic  .  .  -0.0  
I stri l r s  r t rs -    .  .  -0.0  
iti  ll r s -   .  .  -0.0  
lec quip    .  .  -0.3  
ac i e ls, etal -  14 - .  .  -0.2  
Sur ic l  e i l I str -3    - .  .  - .  
Shipbuil i   epairi  -68 1 6  -0.  0.  -0.1  
easuring  ontrol Inst -135 132 
-
267 -0.1  0.1  -0.2  
achine Tools, utting -40 31 71 -0.2  0.1  -0.3  
Foot ear, ut Stock -15 0 15 -0.9  0.0  -0.9  
ircraft Parts & Equip -2,088 2,683 - 4,772 -1.2  1.5  -2.7  
Source: O ,19 0 
Table 5 
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In contrast, the only defense related sector that experienced a net negative annual 
effect, Aircraft Parts and Equipment, was a sector of the aerospace industry where foreign 
competition was already strongest. The coordinating committee's views were supported by 
a Department of Commerce's publication which stated: 
Foreign competition is gaining intensity in the aircraft parts sector, as more 
countries gain experience in the manufacture of aircraft parts through licensed 
and shared production agreements. During sales negotiations, U.S. aircraft 
manufacturers are under considerable pressure from foreign countries to make 
production-sharing agreements. Imports of aircraft parts have more than 
doubled since 1982, climbing from $1.6 billion to about $3.4 billion in 1988. 
Canada, France and the United Kingdom are the largest foreign suppliers of 
aircraft parts to the U.S. market, but imports from developing countries, such 
as China, South Korea and Taiwan are increasing at a rapid rate. (DoC, 1989) 
The results of the offset study seem to be consistent with the notion that offset 
implementations flow through the path of least resistance. Companies tend to implement their 
offset requirements in those areas where foreign capabilities already exist. Where offset 
implementations are defense related, they often take place in the large, but less technologically 
important sectors, where there is already a substantial and growing foreign capability. When 
offsets implementations are not defense related they are generally distributed in sectors that 
reflect the existing industrial strengths of the purchasing country, reinforcing the status quo. 
(OMB, 1990) 
D. OFFSET IMPACT ON EMPLOYMENT 
The coordinating committee's analysis of the employment effects due to offsets 
provided less succinct conclusions then their results concerning defense preparedness or 
industrial competitiveness. The weakness in their conclusions stemmed from the 
methodology they used to collect the data necessary from which to draw them. 
The coordinating committee's approach in its evaluation of offset effects on 
employment was derived from the prime contractors' estimates of the employment effects of 
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a particular sale and the employment effects determined by means of the input-output table 
and output-labor ratios of the U.S. economy. 
The prime contractors' estimates included only the direct employment effects within 
their facilities and not indirect effects on secondary or lower tier subcontractors. In order to 
estimate these effects, the coordinating committee turned to the input-output (I-O) table. The 
1-0 table, with the aid of output-labor ratios, indicated that the indirect employment effects 
are likely to be greater that the direct effects, however the effectiveness of their evaluation 
of the employment question was hampered by the assumption that the prime contractors' 
estimates were presented in a light that was favorable for their purposes, and not necessarily 
a true representation of the employment effects. (OMB, 1990) 
Another major deficiency was highlighted by the Director of the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis. In his February 28, 1989 memorandum he stated that the prime's used a variety of 
methods to estimate the offset effects on employment to include the following: 
1) There would have been no sale without the offsets; therefore, there was 
an employee gain equal to that involved in the work done under the contract. 
2) Cannot derive a number directly, so used the product of the $/employee 
year estimate and the value of the implementation. 
3) Guessed at what employment the foreign firm gained in producing the 
offset implementation. 
4) Made the answer zero because it was very small or could not make a 
rational guess. (BEA, 1989) 
This problem occurred in both large and small companies. Solutions, such as 
recontacting the companies and having them re-estimate the data using some consistent 
methodology, would have been very expensive and time consuming. A supplemental survey, 
focusing only on this question, also would have required considerable resources. 
The coordinating committee adopted method (b) presented in the BEA memorandum. 
Their method used the output-labor ratio, as estimated by the prime contractors, to derive the 
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estimates of the direct employment effects of offsets. Since the primes' responses probably 
overestimated the direct employment effects of the sales, this method tended to overestimate 
the adverse direct employment effects of offsets. 
Their method also overestimated the adverse employment effects because it assumed 
that all offset implementation reduced domestic production and, therefore, employment. They 
point out that $500 million of the offset implementations were assumed by the prime's 
offshore subcontractor and another $238 million taken on by foreign sub-contractors. Since 
both of these groups of establishments are likely to replace foreign rather than domestic 
production, they are unlikely to generate adverse domestic employment effects. While the 
coordinating committee did include these employment effects in their results, their 
assumptions were predicated on the foundation that there were no domestic sub-contractors 
to perform this work, or in the absence of the offset agreements, the work would have gone 
to these groups regardless. 
In assessing the indirect employment effects, the coordinating committee turned once 
again to the 1-0 table for the U.S. economy. To derive the number of employee years 
required to produce the output changes associated with the U.S. foreign military sales, the 
coordinating committee calculated a ratio of the direct employment effects reported by the 
primes to the direct employment effects derived with the aid of the labor/output ratios and the 
1-0 table. This ratio is then used to adjust downward the effects of the sales. 
Given the information and tools they had available, the coordinating committee made 
an attempt to quantify the indirect employment effects. However, certain assumptions and 
the accuracy of the data received from the prime's once again affected their results. The 1-0 
table used was, admittedly, out of date and ignored the relationships of changes in relative 
prices over time and the response to technological change. As wages increase over time, and 
technology allows producer's to build weapons systems cheaper with less manpower, the 
resulting indirect employment effects are likely a worse case projection. The 1-0 table does 
not recognize the existence of economies of scale. Assuming that most foreign military sales 
are extensions of U.S. military service's contracts, and merely lengthen the production runs, 
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this omission is likely to have severe effects in the case of predicting indirect employment 
effects of both the sales and the offsets. 
In general their analysis showed that offsets have little effect on overall U.S. 
employment. Military sales abroad that contractually require offsets are likely to have a net 
increase in domestic employment of 2,500 employee years per year. They admit that specific 
contractors or subcontractors may suffer declines in domestic employment due to offset 
agreements; however, these declines are likely to be countered by equal or greater 
employment gains in other sectors of the U.S. economy. (OMB, 1990) 
The offset effects redistribute employment across U.S. industries. They induce shifts 
in employment to industries where the U.S. has a comparative advantage from industries that 
have a significant foreign presence or dominance. They do not say with certainty that there 
is no loss in total employment in certain industrial sectors due to offsets but emphasize the 
redistributed effects that reinforce the status quo. 
For the period 1980 -1987, domestic production of the military goods sold required 
110,000 employee-years of labor. Their figures showed that about 50 percent of these gains 
occurred in two industrial sectors, aircraft and aircraft and missile engines, two areas where 
the U.S. has a commanding lead over other foreign competitors. Their figures also indicated 
that offset implementations effect a broader range of sectors than do the actual sales, in many 
cases adversely affecting many industries that do not benefit directly from sales. In the case 
of the aircraft sector, which accounts for 45 percent of all sales, they accounted for only 2 
percent of the offset implementations. This is indicative of the trend that the effects of offsets 
fall disproportionately on industries other than those that generate the sales. 
E. OFFSET IMPACT ON TRADE 
The coordinating committee's analysis of the impact offsets have on the trade of the 
U.S. was focused on the distribution of sales and offset obligations by recipient country and 
by sector. Their analysis, however, was challenged by the fact that at the time of the survey 
many of the primes did not know the product sectors in which the offset concessions would 
occur.    When the product involved was known, the trade consequences were often 
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ambiguous.   In the case of countertrade, technology transfer or investment, the trade 
consequences are not readily identifiable and are likely to occur beyond the short term. 
Given the limitations with the survey data, the coordinating committee organized the 
offset obligations into three categories. 
1. Offsets agreements assumed to increase U.S. imports, (i.e., countertrade) 
2. Offset agreements assumed to reduce the level of U.S. exports, (i.e., coproduction, 
subcontracting and licensed production) 
3. Offset agreements whose trade effects are ambiguous or undetermined, (i.e., direct 
investment, technology transfer and those not known by primes) 
Their analysis concluded that the effect on U.S. trade of transactions reported in the 
survey was positive. The total billings of $19.8 billion in 1980-1987 compared to total offset 
implementations forthat period of $10.7 billion. (OMB, 1990) 
The sectoral effects were evaluated by segregating the offset agreements according 
to the sector they affected and comparing them with their respective billings. Table 6 shows 
the net effects of billings and offset implementations in the 1980-1987 period. 
The net effect of the offset agreements was strongly positive for most aerospace 
industries such as aircraft, radars and aircraft engines. These industries reaped substantial net 
benefits, even though the offset implementations they provided were in themselves significant. 
Additionally, smaller positive effects occurred in non-aerospace industries such as 
Communications Equipment and Engines and Turbines. 
All the news, however, was not good. In the aircraft parts, electronic components, 






Major Sectoral Effect, 1980-1987 
Total Billings and Offset Implementations 
(Millions of Dollars) 
Sector Billings Offset Net Effect 
Aircraft 8907.6 210.0 8,697.6 
Search/Navigation Equip 4059.2 1,531.3 2,527.9 
Aircraft Engines/Parts 3350.5 1,402.0 1,948.5 
Communications Equip 841.5 102.7 738.8 
Guided Missile/Space Veh 817.4 43.8 773.6 
Ordnance & Accessories 718.7 195.4 523.3 
Motor Vehicles & Equip 515.3 95.4 419.9 
Aircraft Parts 223.0 3,792.7 -3,569.7 
Engines & Turbines 191.3 61.3 130.0 
Tanks & Components 41.9 0.0 41.9 
Computer & Office Equip 35.9 54.3 -    18.4 
Elect Components & Acces 26.1 490.6 - 464.5 
Basic Steel Products 0.0 195.4 -  195.4 
Industrial Machinery 0.0 137.6 - 137.6 
Source: OMB 1990 
Table 6 
The findings on how offsets effect trade are consistent with the coordinating 
committee's previous findings on defense preparedness, industrial competitiveness and 
employment. The sectors that experienced a negative effect due to offsets are those where 
a significant foreign presence exists and U.S. firms are at a comparative disadvantage. 
The coordinating committee also organized their information in an attempt to shed 
further light on who was receiving offset concessions relative to their research and 
development (R&D) resources as classified by the Organization of Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD). The OECD classifies its member countries as either high, 
medium or low R&D countries, depending on the amount of funding and number of technical 
personnel they devote to R&D activities.   A number of developing countries were also 
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prevalent in the survey results and the OECD classification was augmented by groupings of 
LDCs. The LDCs were divided into two groups. One group consisted of those LDCs having 
a 1988 per capita GNP of over $2,000 and the remaining group consisted of those with a 
1988 per capita GNP of below $1,000. These groups were designated the High Income and 
Low Income LDCs. 
Table 7 shows the breakdown of where a particular country fell in relation to the 
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Table 7 and 8 both illustrate that offsets benefit mainly the OECD high and medium 
countries, who received 70 percent of the total offset value. The next greatest concentration 
is in the LDC High countries, which include Israel and Korea. When added to the previous 
group, these three groups account for over 90 percent of the dollar value of offsets reported 
by the survey. 
For the offset category "Expanded Imports", the highest three categories are again 
OECD High, Medium and LDC High countries. This offset category included countertrade 
that normally comes in the form of indirect offsets, offsets that are not associated with the 
military article being purchased. This category is attractive to these country groups because 
it allows them to take advantage of selling products they are already competitive in, increasing 
their markets. 
For offset category "Reduced Imports", once again includes the countries contained 
in the OECD High, Medium and LDC high classifications. This category includes 
coproduction, subcontracting or licensed production types of offsets. These countries are 
capitalizing on existing domestic industrial capacity with the aim of enlarging or fully 
employing existing industries. The coordinating committee concluded this to be the case and 
discounted the notion that these countries were attempting to create a new industry. 
The final offset category, "Ambiguous", is perhaps the one of greatest concern, in that 
its consequences are not known. Most often associated with technology transfer and direct 
investment, the ramifications of such actions cannot be determined in the near-term. This 
category also includes offset agreements that were unknown at the time of the survey, again 
limiting the conclusions that can be drawn. Given that over 47 percent of the total offset 
value is held by LDC High countries, a general conclusion that these countries are attempting 
to acquire the technology and "know-how" to improve their own self-sufficiency can be made. 
The consequences of this particular category are likely to be realized in the future and would 
warrant further attention and evaluation. 
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F. SUMMARY 
The coordinating committee's conclusions contained in the OMB 1990 report 
generally state that while offsets are an aberration of the free market mechanism, they are 
generally favorable or at least neutral in their effects on the U.S. From their macroeconomic 
evaluations in the areas of defense preparedness, industrial competitiveness, employment and 
trade, they have concluded that on a whole the U.S. comes out ahead. They recognize that 
certain sectors of the U.S. industry do in fact suffer negative effects from offsets, but these 
are countered when the positive and negative effects are aggregated. 
The significance of the coordinating committee's 1990 study of the effects offset 
agreements have on the U.S. is that it is perhaps the most comprehensive macro study 
conducted by any private or public organization. For this reason, this chapter has been 
devoted to the description and findings of their analysis. Their analysis and findings will help 
illustrate, in Chapter V, how offset agreements are a facet of the globalization of the world's 
economies, the potential consequences of this trend to the U.S. and how the U.S. can adapt 






V. OFFSET AGREEMENTS AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF DEFENSE 
PRODUCTION 
Chapter V will analyze the macro effects of offset agreements on the U.S. and discuss 
how offset agreements of the past have contributed to the globalization of the U.S. arms 
industry. 
A. GENERAL 
The OMB chaired coordinating committee's analysis of the effects offset agreements 
have on the U.S. was very ambitious and difficult due to the range of factors involved. To 
accurately determine how an offset agreement will impact defense let alone non-defense 
industry sectors in regards to employment would require tracking individual offset agreements 
from their inception down to each industry sector affected. With the limitations of time and 
funds available, such an endeavor was not possible and led to the adoption of a macro 
approach as opposed to a micro one. Their subsequent analysis and report provides a very 
accurate picture of the overall impact of offsets on the U.S. in the areas of defense 
preparedness and defense industrial competitiveness, but is less succinct in the area of 
employment. This shortcoming is due to the limitations associated with the macro approach. 
To adequately determine the effects on unemployment, a much more detailed database would 
have been required, with subcontractors, representative of the lower tier producers, surveyed. 
This approach also has its faults in that it will provide an accurate picture of direct offset 
effects, however; indirect effects will remain an estimate at best. 
The 1990 OMB report on the effects of offsets noted that the implementation of offset 
agreements tends to take the least path of resistance. (OMB, 1990) Foreign buyers who 
require offsets as a condition of sale are concerned with enhancing their existing domestic 
capabilities. Consequently offsets have their greatest effects in sectors where the presence of 
foreign competitors is significant or dominant. This indicates that offset agreements do not 
necessarily disrupt the equilibrium between the world's economies but rather reinforces this 
status quo. 





production, but rather entails a significant shift away toward internationalization. 
Multinational arms production, through collaboration on individual weapons systems between 
countries or via interfirm relationships across the international arms industry, seems to be 
expanding (Bitzinger, 1994). This emergence of transnational arms production is reshaping 
much of the international arms industry and will require the U.S. Government to rethink its 
trade policies in light of the globalization trend. 
This chapter will analyze the globalization trend and depict the role offset agreements 
have had in reinforcing this new configuration. 
B. OFFSETS AND GLOBALIZATION 
It is interesting to note that much of the globalization that has occurred since the mid 
1980s has been due in part to the cooperation and offsets provided by the U.S. We are 
reaping what we have sown. 
U.S. assistance to Europe following World War n, helping them recover economically 
and militarily, has led to their emergence as a significant force within the arms market. 
Sharing a common goal of defending against Soviet aggression and expansion, interoperability 
between NATO forces was of particular concern.  U.S. motivation for such cooperation 
emphasized the military advantage of NATO.    In Washington's eyes, by eliminating 
duplication and competition in the development, production and procurement of weapon 
systems, NATO would not only be more capable but more efficient as well, saving money 
while fielding a more effective force (Webb, 1992). This viewpoint was predicated on the 
notion that the duplication and competition to be eliminated was on the other side of the 
Atlantic since the U.S. was already developing American weapons systems for U.S. forces 
and represented the latest in military technology. The European members of NATO focused 
on the economic and political importance. West European governments stressed the benefits 
of jobs, the development of their high-tech R&D bases, and export sales arising from 
armaments production (Bitzinger, 1994). 
This divergence of viewpoints became the basis for the increase in offset requirements 
for U.S. systems not only among NATO member countries but also Canada, Australia, Japan 
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and many countries in the Third World who also entertain notions of building their own 
defense industrial capabilities. 
As one examines this restructuring and the associated industrial activities involved, 
the range includes such items as technology transfers, international subcontracting, licensed 
production, co-development and co-production of major weapon systems; the same types of 
activities popular among countries requiring offset agreements. The growth of offset 
agreements in the early to mid 1980s also coincides with the globalization trend. 
With this restructuring comes a new lexicon of terms, listed in Table 1, which are 
familiar to the commercial sector, but potentially may carry serious consequences for the arms 
market. The globalization of arms production began with international cooperation among 
the countries of the NATO alliance, characterized by offset agreements between the 
participating countries. Between 1950 and 1960 the U.S. was the dominant supplier of 
licenses to produce U.S. weapons systems to NATO countries. The adoption of the 
Eisenhower Doctrine, Kennedy's Alliance for Progress and the Nixon Doctrine expanded the 
number of recipients of U.S. offset agreements in the form of production licenses to include 
countries in the Middle East and Asia (Bitzinger, 1994). The United States during this period 
licensed the production of the F-104 fighter jet to Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy 
and Japan, the M-60 tank to Italy and the Sidewinder missile to Japan, Taiwan and several 
NATO countries (Bitzinger, 1994). During this same time period, licenses granted by other 
countries were also on the rise. Western European countries granted licenses to countries in 
Latin America, Southeast Asia and the Middle East. India worked both sides of the Iron 
Curtain, producing both French helicopters and Soviet missiles. 
Licensed production was a means by which the recipient country could develop its 
own capability for arms production; however its was not without its drawbacks. Licensed 
production is essentially a one-way street. The recipient remains dependent on the supplier 
for the technology and remains to some extent a captive audience; a client state of sort, 
subject to the whims and generosity of the providing country. While the weapon system that 
is licensed is likely a mature and capable system, it is also likely to be obsolete given the rapid 
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technological advances made during that period. 
From the perspective of the supplying country, they bear the costs and risks of 
developing these new weapon systems that are not compensated by the licensing process. 
Table 1 
GLOBALIZATION OF ARMS PRODUCTION: DEFINITION OF TERMS 
Co-development: The transnational design, development and production of a weapon 
system. 
Collaboration: The international coproduction or co-development of a weapon system. 
Consortium/Consortia: A formal but ad hoc industrial arrangement to co-develop or 
co-produce a single weapon system. 
Family of Weapons: An international division of labor involving several related 
weapons systems, whereby participating countries separately develop a particular 
weapon within the group and then permit the other participants to produce that weapon 
for themselves. 
Government-led Initiative: Globalization projects or activities initiated by government 
entities. 
Industry-led Initiative: Globalization projects or activities initiated by defense firms. 
Joint Venture: An international company jointly owned and operated by defense firms 
in two or more countries in order to co-develop or co-produce a particular weapon or 
class of weapons. 
Licensed Production: The transnational sale of the rights to manufacture a weapon 
system originally developed within the supplier country. 
Mergers and Acquisitions: The purchase of shares in a defense firm by a defense 
company in another country, up to gaining majority control in that firm. 
Strategic Alliance: A loose industrial arrangement between defense firms in two or 
more countries to study or plan future possible co-production or co-development. 
Source: Bitzinger, 1994 
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Even though licensed production remains a major mode of armaments production 
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Figure 1 International Arms Cooperation 1961 -1995 
to create a two-way street, where arms producing countries could share the costs and risks 
of weapons development and manufacture has become more popular. Figure 1 illustrates 
how the form of international arms cooperation has changed over the past 35 years from one 
dominated by licensed production to today's environment where codevelopment/coproduction 
make up the majority of the programs.   Offset agreements associated with this type of 
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cooperation accounted for over $6.6 billion during the 1980-87 timeframe (OMB, 1990).12 
The catalyst that initiated the increase in cooperation between allies and friendly 
nations was the emergence of the Soviet Union as a superpower following World War II and 
the NATO alliance that emerged to combat that threat. Increasingly, NATO countries 
invested in their own indigenous arms production capabilities; however, rationalization, 
standardization and interoperability (RSI) requirements between their systems and their allies 
increased the number of cooperative programs. Ironically, it was the fall of the Soviet Union 
and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact that provided the next push towards the global 
economic integration of the arms market. 
The end of the Cold War led many governments to make substantial cuts in their 
defense spending. Coupled with the increasing research and development and production 
costs associated with the next generation weapon systems this has resulted in fewer new 
weapon systems being developed and existing systems procured in smaller numbers. As U. S. 
defense industries are confronted with a shrinking defense market and excess production 
capacity, they are looking for customers abroad. DoD is unable to fully support the U.S. 
defense industrial complex and exports are expected to account for about 25 percent of the 
defense contractors' revenue in the future (Vartabedian and Broder, 15 Nov 1994). 
Defense firms, both in the U.S. and abroad, have been aggressively pursuing overseas 
arms sales. In 1992, U.S. arms producers sold over $28 billion worth of military equipment, 
compared to $12 billion in 1991. In 1993, U.S. arms sales amounted to $32 billion. 
(Vartabein and Marshall, 1993) 
While no government figures are available that account for the value of the associated 
offset agreements, past experience leads to the conclusion that they were required. The sale 
of F-16s and Bradley Fighting Vehicles to Turkey in 1992 required Lockheed Fort Worth and 
FMC to produce portions of these weapon systems in Turkey (McHenry, 1994). 
12The OMB 1990 report subdivided coproduction offset agreements into both 
coproduction and subcontractor production categories which accounted for $3.2 and $3.4 billion 
in offset obligations for the 1980-87 time period. Coproduction tends to be at the system 
integrator level, while subcontractor production occurs at lower production tiers. 
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To illustrate how offset agreements contribute to the globalization of the arms market 
two major sales are discussed. 
1. Patriot Missile System 
In 1984, the U.S. Secretary of Defense and the Federal Republic of Germany's 
Minister of Defense signed an agreement implementing cooperative measures for improving 
air defense in Central Europe. As part of this agreement, Germany agreed to purchase 
through foreign military sales 14 Patriot fire units from the U.S. Government for $872 million 
dollars (OMB, 1989). 
A critical aspect in concluding this agreement was a separate arrangement, according 
to which the U.S. Raytheon Corporation agreed to provide German industry with $500 
million in offsets for contracts to manufacture Patriot components and spare parts and for 
logistical services (OMB, 1989).  Five firms in Germany were licensed to produce major 
Table 2 
PATRIOT SUBCONTRACTOR PRODUCTION AGREEMENT 
German U.S. 
Firm Licensor Component Quantity 
MBB Morton Thiokol Rocket Motor 1,980 
MBB Martin Marietta Propulsion Section 1,980 
MBB Raytheon and 
Martin Marietta 
Missile Round Assy 1,980 
MBB N/A Safety and Arming 
Devices & Warheads 1,680 
MBB Martin Marietta Control Section Assy 840 
AEG Raytheon Travelling Wave Tubes 1,680 




Diehl Eagle Picher Batteries 1,680 
Diehl Raytheon Electric Modules 10,316 
Motorenwerk Raytheon Cables 16,416 
Bremerhaven 
Source: OMB, 1989 
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Subsystems for the Patriot system that accounted for over $300 million of the offset package, 
with the German contractor, Messerschmitt, Boelkow and Blohm (MBB) accounting for two 
thirds of this production. Table 2 provides a list of the German firms that participated along 
with the components they built. 
The Patriot sale to Germany is a case of an international arms sale where the foreign 
policy considerations and military operational requirements outweigh the consequences 
associated with trade balance and industrial competitiveness. 
U.S. industry benefitted from the sale of the Patriot fire units. However, the direct 
offsets in the form of coproduction, subcontracting and technology transfer will likely 
contribute to the capabilities of German industry. 
The U.S. contractor whose parts and components are now being produced by a 
German firm will likely face increased competition in bidding and being subcontracted on 
future Patriot orders. From the perspective of Raytheon, with the objective of securing 
additional foreign sales, having a German subcontractor could be a major selling point when 
selling their system to other Western European countries. 
A sale between the U.S. and the Netherlands for the Patriot system had similar 
characteristics and consequences similar to sale to Germany. In the Netherlands case, the 
offset value of $305 million was equal to the purchase price (OMB, 1990). The Netherland 
company Fokker aircraft was licensed to produce electronic circuit boards and power 
supplies, and duplicated Raytheon's special factory test equipment. Additionally the U.S. 
agreed to buy $70 million worth of Patriot missile canisters produced in the Netherlands. 
In the Netherlands case, U.S. "know-how" and technology was transferred to the 
Netherlands and will likely increase competition within those defense industry sectors. The 
level of competition could also increase if the transferred technology has dual-use 
applications, causing it to ripple through commercial industry sectors as well. 
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2. AW ACS 
The sale of Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft to Britain in 
1987 involved offsets of 130 percent of the contract value. Given the fact that Britain is a 
major arms producer in its own right, this agreement warrants further analysis. 
In December of 1986, the British Ministry of Defence announced the selection of the 
Boeing AWACS as the system to satisfy their country's airborne early warning requirement. 
This decision was preceded by competition between U.S. and U.K. defense corporations 
which opened in the summer of 1986. The initial competition included seven companies 
submitting bids, but was dominated by the U.S. Boeing Corporation's AWACS and GECs 
Nimrod AEW.3. Boeing's opening bid included 35 percent of the contract value in offset 
concessions, which increased to 100 percent a month later, which is the normal minimum 
acceptable to the British Government. 
In September ofthat year, Boeing and Nimrod were selected as the finalists in the 
competition, shortly thereafter, Boeing increased its offset offer to 130 percent of the 
contract value. During this same time period Boeing had negotiated participation agreements 
with three British avionics firms, Plessey, Ferranti and Racal, who in turn publicly supported 
AWACS over the Nimrod system. These firms were not participants in the Nimrod program. 
The agreements simply stated the intent to cooperate should the AWACS be selected. The 
fact that the three British firms party to this agreement were the largest aerospace-related 
firms in Britain played an important role in making the American buy seem less onerous to 
the members of the Defence Ministry. 
The selection of the Boeing AWACS to fulfill the British Government's airborne early 
warning requirement was met with public outrage originating from GEC, the maker of the 
Nimrod. The loss of jobs in the British electronic industry was estimated at 2,500. However, 
the British Minister of Defence, George Younger, stated that the gains to other British firms 
would equal or exceed the losses to GEC. 
The formal agreement between Britain and Boeing included only 5 percent of the 130 
as directly associated with the AWACS program. The remaining 125 percent were indirect, 
associated with high technology defense and aerospace product areas. Additionally awards 
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to British firms in future Boeing contracts would be counted toward the offset, effectively 
providing an incentive for Boeing to look "more favorably" on British firms that were as 
competitive as U.S. or other firms for future contracts. 
The objectives of the British offset program, to facilitate the development of "high 
technology" in the UK defense and aerospace industry, were achieved with the AW ACS 
purchase. Plessey, the British aerospace firm that supported the AWACS buy, has teamed 
with Boeing in bidding for the Iceland Air Defense System being procured by NATO. 
Additionally, Plessey is cooperating with Boeing and Westinghouse, the manufacturer of the 
surveillance radar system in the AWACS, in other areas to include advanced air-based and 
land-based radars, advanced technical research and future development of airborne early 
warning system modifications and improvements. 
Other areas under consideration for Westinghouse/Plessey offset cooperation include 
Ballistic Missile Defense research programs, fiber optics technology and sensor systems 
technology. 
The sale of the AWACS as well as the Patriot sale to Germany and the Netherlands 
illustrate how the U.S. has aided its allies and friends in developing their domestic industrial 
capabilities in defense and non-defense sectors. The sharing of a common objective to 
provide security to the European continent superseded the consequences of the offset to the 
U.S. industrial base. In the case of the AWACS sale, it is very evident that the 130 percent 
offset agreement played a major role in the selection. Given the environment at the time, with 
the Cold War ongoing and arms sales relatively high compared with today, having the 
increased competition was not particularly threatening to the U.S. industrial competitiveness. 
Extending those concessions into the present, with arms sales dropping significantly, 
the assistance the U.S. provided to its allies and friends in the past could have significant 
consequences in the future. The threat is not at the system level, where the U.S. remains the 
leader, but rather at the component and subassembly level where many of the offset 
agreements have been focused. The threat is not that another country will develop a fighter 
or main battle tank that can compete with a U.S. design, but rather that the wings for that 
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fighter or components for the tank may be dominated by a foreign manufacturer, whose initial 
start in that sector was provided by offset agreements in the past. Foreign subcontractors 
could also be the firm of choice for U.S. defense producers where existing offset obligations 
can be met through their use or in circumstances where having a foreign subcontractor is 
politically to their benefit when selling their arms abroad. 
These implications are the concern for the future and the symptoms of the 
globalization trend. To remain competitive for a bid, a U.S. firm must offer offsets to the 
foreign buyer. To remain competitive and solvent in the long term, the same U.S. firm must 
rely more heavily on export sales and establish long term relationships with foreign 
contractors or subcontractors. 
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF GLOBALIZATION 
The globalization of the world's economies for commercial or non-defense products 
is not a new phenomenon. As the nations of the world shifted from an agrarian culture to an 
industrialized one, each nation became somewhat dependent on others due to scarcity of 
natural resources. As technology improved the sophistication of the tools and products used, 
each nation tended to specialize in high technology or labor intensive markets. Each nation 
relied upon the other to provide the goods and services it lacked. High tech countries 
exported labor intensive production to the nations that specialized in such skills, while the 
nations that specialized in labor markets imported the high tech goods. The nations of the 
world, either by design or by circumstance, established a niche for themselves within the 
world market place. 
This same phenomenon appears to be happening within the world's arm market. No 
nation is entirely self-sufficient in arms production, but to some degree relies upon other 
nations to produce or acquire arms. This new development in the global arms industry started 
in the mid to late 1980s as international takeovers and joint ventures restructured the 
international arms market. The U.S. has participated in transnational development and 
production of weapon systems, most notably the F-16 upgrade with a European consortium 
and the AV-8B Harrier II codevelopment/coproduction program with the U.K.. However, 
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much of the cooperation has occurred in Western Europe. Table 3 lists the number of joint 
ventures, strategic alliances and mergers and acquisitions that have occurred in the 1961-1993 
timeframe. 
The more recent defense-related joint ventures and mergers and acquisitions have 
taken place predominately in Western Europe, supplanting existing national defense industries 
with regional alliances. The strategy involved in these crossborder mergers/collaboration 
involved not only sharing the risks associated with new weapons development and 
production, but also access to foreign technologies, markets and achieving economies of 
scales in arms production quicker with the greater demand. 
Table 3  
The Globalization of the Defense Industry, 1961-93 
Joint Ventures            Strategic Alliances Mergers & Acquisitions 
1961-65 
1966-70                        -                                 - ! 
1971-75                         2                                  - 1 
1976-80 1 
1981-85                        1                                 - l 
1986-90                       11                                  7 55 
1991-93                       16                                16 23 
Source: DBP Globalization Database 
This regional consolidation in Western Europe, combined with the potential for the 
political integration and emergence of a Western Europe self-identity may play a major role 
in the success of future U.S. arms sales in this region. The arms market, long dominated by 
the U.S., will likely include a pan-European arms industry, where the U.S. is considered a 
competitor vice a partner in arms development and production. Western European defense 
cooperation will likely include a "European preference" in military procurement at the expense 
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of U.S. arms. France's criticism of Greece and Switzerland for buying U.S. rather than 
European-built fighter jets is a possible example of the protectionism that may be prevalent 
in the future (Briganti and Silverberg, 1993). U.S. defense firms may find themselves frozen 
out of the Western European arms market, unable to do business with Britain and Germany 
in the fashion they have in the past. 
The viability of the U.S. arms industry, given the downward spiralling domestic sales, 
will increasingly depend on cooperation between U.S. and foreign firms. This cooperation 
will come in the form of offset agreements to include coproduction/development of weapon 
systems and foreign subcontracting of major components. This cooperation will not be of 
a fleeting nature but more qualitative. Ad hoc cooperation will be replaced by more 
sophisticated, complex and permanent relationships, accelerating globalization of the defense 
industries, where no nation will be able to pay the price associated with an independent, 
wholly indigenous defense industrial base. 
The attitude of the U.S. Government regarding the more qualitative nature of this 
cooperation has been extremely critical when confronted with foreign purchase of U.S. 
defense corporations. The attempted acquisition of Loral Vought by Matra of France was 
met by strong opposition within Congress, which took the view that foreign ownership or 
control of U.S. defense corporations undermined our indigenous arms capabilities and 
national security. But the acquisition of Fairchild Defense Systems, a U.S. aerospace firm by 
the same Matra and the pending sale of the U.S. based Allison Engine Company, maker of 
the engines for the C-130 transport aircraft, V-22 Tiltrotor and the RAH-66 Comanche 
helicopter, to the British firm Rolls Royce may indicate a softening of congressional concern 
and recognition of globalization in the arms industry. Such a move would give Rolls Royce 
a potential foothold in the U.S. military and commercial engine market. In addition to 
forming a link between the U.S. and Europe on programs such as the V-22 tiltrotor and the 
C-130 J transport aircraft, if these systems are released for overseas sale, a key selling point 
could be that the engines, made by Allison, are part of a European defense firm. 
Much of the U.S. response to globalization and the reduction in domestic defense 
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spending has been the internal restructuring of the U.S. defense industry. Notable mergers 
such as Martin Marietta with Lockheed are designed to strengthen their positions in niche 
markets. This merger is anticipated to control 32 percent of the tactical aircraft market, due 
to the strength of Lockheed Corporation's aircraft programs, including the F-22, F-16 and F- 
117, along with the C-130 transport aircraft. Lockheed Martin, as it is now called, would 
also supply 52 percent of the launch services by Western companies, crossing into non- 
defense aerospace and space systems markets. (Finnegan, 1994) 
Martin Marietta Corporation Chairman Norman Augustine stated that with "this 
particular consolidation we built a critical mass to compete in international markets. These 
are Darwinian times in our industry. The failure to change is the failure to survive." 
(Finnegan, 1994) Similar mergers have come in response to Lockheed Martin's to include the 
merger of Northrop Grumman and Vought Aircraft with more mergers of U.S. corporation 
expected. 
The restructuring of U.S. defense corporations will likely be tied with an increased 
emphasis on transatlantic cooperation. It is unlikely that foreign purchase of U.S. 
corporations will rise significantly; however, international armaments collaboration in the 
areas of subcontracting, dual-use technologies, data transfer, basic research and offsets will 
be the tools of choice to achieve this cooperation. 
There already exists a sizable international trade in defense applicable subsystems and 
most U.S. weapon systems actually contain considerable numbers of foreign components. 
Some subsystems are based on dual-use technologies or components such as computers, 
electronics and communications, and represent a hidden form of globalization. U.S. combat 
aircraft are equipped with British heads-up displays and ejections seats, while American 
precision-guided munitions often rely on Japanese-produced computer chips and ceramic 
packages. 
This cooperation extends to personnel exchanges of engineers and scientists where 
transnational technology sharing is conducted. Sharing of basic and exploratory defense 
research and development is also on the rise. Collaborative activities such as Rockwell with 
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DAS A a German aerospace firm, on the X-31 experimental aircraft and McDonnel Douglas 
with British Aerospace on advanced vertical takeoff technology are indicators of the 
globalization trend. Additional international collaboration in the commercial marketplace, 
specifically aerospace and electronics, involving East Asia, Russia and Eastern Europe are 
also indicative of this trend when the prospects for potential spin-on military applications are 
considered. 
D. CONSEQUENCES OF OFFSETS IN GLOBALIZATION 
The findings presented do not portend a specific trend but rather a more general one. 
Offset agreements of the past, particularly in the area of coproduction/development, 
subcontractor production and technology transfer have given rise to the number and 
capabilities of foreign competitors. These agreements have established more or less formal 
relationships between U.S. prime contractors with defense contractors abroad. With the 
drawdown of arms sales, and the increasingly protectionist philosophies of Western European 
governments, U.S. contractors, to maintain their economic viability and competitive positions, 
are finding it increasingly necessary to expand their transnational connections and engage in 
more cooperative programs in order to share risks, gain access to foreign technologies and 
markets (Bitzinger, 1994). 
Similar trends that characterized the collaboration between the U.S. and Western 
Europe that gave rise to their defense industrial base appear to be occuring in the developing 
world. Third world countries have increasingly become partners in collaborative arms 
projects. Since the 1970s, when only a handful of third world countries possessed the 
capability to manufacture arms, more than 20 countries have developed that capability. While 
licensed production remains the major means of arms manufacture, as with NATO during its 
early years, codevelopment/production is on the rise in developing countries. Figure 2 
illustrates the trend that has occurred from 1961 to the present. 
As developing countries have developed their own capabilities, they have established 
considerable sophistication in certain arms niches, such as light combat aircraft, antishipping 
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Figure 2 U.S. Arms Cooperation with Third World Countries 1961 -1995 
missiles, defense electronics and systems upgrades. These newly industrialized countries are 
exporting this "know-how" abroad to other countries of the developing world to increase 
their market share. Israel, maker of the Gabriel antiship missile, has issued licenses to Taiwan 
for that purpose. Cooperation between China and South Africa, and Pakistan in the areas of 
missiles, aircraft and armored systems is a further indication that the development and transfer 
of weapons technology between developing countries is on the rise. 
The increasing globalization of arms production has economic, as well as political and 
military consequences for both the U.S. Government and industry. Shrinking military 
procurements and the absence of an identifiable foe that would warrant increased spending, 
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preservation of our defense industrial base. By establishing international relationships within 
the arms industry, the U.S. may be able to cost-effectively maintain the necessary military 
R&D and production capability for our national defense. The U.S., due to the strength of its 
industrial base and its dominance in the aerospace industry, will not need to go to the 
extremes that other countries may. The U.S. will not, however, remain untouched. The 
effect will occur at the lower tier subcontractor level, where a foreign presence is significant 
or dominant. These areas are where past offset agreements have had their greatest effect and 
are likely to be more significant in the future. 
The notion of maintaining an indigenous U.S. defense industry has gone the way of 
the horse and buggy. Regional alliances such as the Western European Union and its 
associated West European Armaments Group, founded on the basis to maintaining a viable 
independent defense industrial and technology base, will likely close their markets to countries 
or foreign defense firms who do not subscribe to this new level of cooperation. Similar to 
consequences contained in the newly adopted General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 
(GATT), countries that do not abide by its content could be subject to penalties, such as trade 
embargoes. 
U.S. participation in international collaborative arms programs must continue to 
emphasize the goals of strengthening its friends and allies and enhancing alliance coordination 
and effectiveness through RSI benefits. Additionally, the U.S. Government must continue to 
address globalization as a means to preserve and strengthen the U.S. defense industrial base, 
by gaining access to foreign markets and innovative technologies, particularly commercial 
technology with dual-use application. Americans would like to be self-sufficient in not only 
defense but all aspects of our economy, enjoying the benefits of higher employment and 
standard of living. But longing for what was or cannot be is counterproductive to making 




Globalization has emerged to some extent due to U.S. benevolence to its allies and 
former enemies following the end of World War II when it rebuilt their economic and military 
capabilities. The emergence of the Soviet threat, and the subsequent NATO alliance, caused 
the U.S. and its allies to realize the importance of commonality of equipment and supplies in 
a European conflict. Motivated by rationalization, standardization and interoperability 
requirements, armaments cooperation within NATO increased, resulting in reduced R&D and 
production costs. As U.S. foreign policy extended beyond the borders of Europe to 
encompass Asia and the Middle East, similar cooperation has occurred. 
The use of offset agreements, particularly in the area of codevelopment/production, 
subcontracting and technology transfer, was one of the mechanism to implement this 
cooperation. Overshadowed by national security and alliance concerns, U.S. economic 
factors in certain sectors of the economy felt the negative effects of the offsets. U.S. 
industries who were competitive and held a strong position on the world market benefitted 
from these agreements. The U.S. aerospace industry increased its trade balance from $4.3 
billion in 1973 to $16 billion in 1987 (OMB, 1989). U.S. companies in the aircraft parts and 
equipment sector suffered a decrease in annual output due to these very same offset 
agreements, attributable to their non-competitive market position and the significance of 
foreign competition in that sector. 
The increase in the number of countries capable of producing arms or components, 
coupled with an era of shrinking military budgets and an increasingly competitive defense 
market, it is apparent that transnational cooperation in arms development and production is 
necessary to maintain the core capabilities within the U.S. defense industrial base. To refuse 
to do so is to be alienated from cooperative arrangements involving foreign markets, 
resources and technologies. 
The globalization trend is not without its negative consequences. The increase in the 
number of developing countries with arms production capabilities warrants attention, as do 
old Cold War policies and mindsets that must be adjusted to the current situation, with the 
necessary foresight to see the potential consequences to be discussed in the Chapter VI. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Offset agreements as a condition of sale for military exports are not, from a macro 
perspective, harmful to the U.S. economy, but are a necessary evil for U.S. defense 
contractors to remain competitive in the world's arms market. With DoD and other nations' 
defense procurement budgets declining, the international arms market is characterized by 
increased competition. Included within this market are competing political objectives, 
designed to enhance the recipient country's economic well-being, that break from the 
traditional free market environment where sales are consummated based on the price and 
quality of the product being sold. Today's arms market is a buyer's market, requiring sellers 
to offer incentives to the buying country that appeal to their economic, political and national 
security objectives. 
Congressional scrutiny of offsets during the mid to late 1980s stated that these 
concessions effectively exported defense jobs and revenue abroad at the expense of U.S. 
workers and corporations. This is partially true. U.S. defense contractors agree to license 
or subcontractor with foreign firms to close their deals, hurting some U.S. companies. The 
negative effects of these agreements are offset by the influx of work created in the U.S. by 
the sale itself. The significance that offset agreements have in international arms sales also 
lends credibility to the notion that without the offset agreement, the sale would not have been 
made. The sale of the Boeing AWACS aircraft to Britain illustrates the importance that offset 
agreements have in completing a transaction. Boeing's agreement to subcontract the 
production of some components and subassemblies in Britain appealed to the British 
Government's objective of enhancing their aerospace and defense industry, making the sale 
less onerous. More importantly, however, it brought $1.13 billion of revenue to the U.S., 
along with continued employment for other U.S. defense corporations (OMB, 1990). 
From a national security perspective, the sale of the AWACS aircraft provided the 
U.K. and the NATO alliance with a sophisticated tactical air threat detection, surveillance and 
early warning capability previously filled by their aging fleet of Shackleton aircraft, which had 
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been in service for 40 years. The adoption of the AWACS by the Royal Air Force appealed 
to NATO rationalization, standardization and interoperability (RSI) desires since the AWACS 
is also used by a number of other NATO countries to include the U.S., France and Germany. 
The issue of offset agreements is also misplaced because it is symptomatic of a much 
larger challenge, namely, globalization of the arms industry.    Offsets are one of the 
mechanisms by which globalization has occurred from its inception between the U.S. and its 
NATO partners to its current practice between the industrialized and developing world. 
Originally designed to lift allies and former foes from the destruction of World War H, the 
U.S. transferred technology and know-how to our European allies in an effort to rebuild their 
economic, industrial and military capabilities. Similar actions have occurred between the U.S. 
and other countries in the Middle East, Asia and Latin America as U.S. resolve to contain 
communism encouraged U.S. investment in the free world in the place of U.S. troops and 
presence. 
This chapter will evaluate the effects offset agreements have had in the areas of 
defense preparedness, industrial competitiveness and U.S. national security. The conclusions 
are drawn not only from the empirical data provided in the coordinating committee's 1990 
report to Congress, but also from information regarding the globalization trend. The chapter 
will conclude with recommendations on how the U.S. can counter the potentially negative 
aspects of globalization, while maintaining the critical core capabilities in the defense 
industrial base. 
A. DEFENSE PREPAREDNESS 
A measure of how offsets have affected the U.S. in the area of defense preparedness 
is its contribution to U.S. national security issues. Offsets have been a critical facet in making 
some sales of U.S. equipment possible to NATO and other allied and friendly countries. 
Offsets' contribution to the NATO objective of RSI has enhanced the defense readiness and 
sustainability of this alliance. These agreements support the U.S. coalition defense strategy, 
which includes not only the U.S. industrial base, but the industrial preparedness of our 
overseas defense partners and their ability in certain contingencies to produce U.S. systems 
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overseas. The threat of interdiction in the North Atlantic sea lanes of replenishment and 
replacement material from the U.S. makes the capability to second source critical material 
from producers on the European continent even more critical to the success of NATO military 
action. 
Another relevant measure of the impact of offsets on defense preparedness is the 
extent to which defense exports and their associated offsets have net economic benefits or 
costs to the sectors of the economy supporting national defense. Conclusions drawn from the 
data compiled from the coordinating committee's 1987 survey indicates that for the period of 
1980 - 1987 the effects of offsets play only a minor role in terms of the overall output of 
defense and non-defense industries. Only five defense related sectors experienced greater 
than a one percent change in net average annual output as a result of the direct effects of sales 
and offsets. Four of the five sectors experienced positive effects and include ordnance and 
accessories, aircraft, aircraft engines and engine parts and engineering and scientific 
instruments. The only sector to experience negative effects was the aircraft parts, component 
and accessories industry. As a whole the U.S. sold almost $35 billion of arms to foreign 
countries while incurring $20 billion in offset obligations (OMB, 1990). 
A major issue in the analysis of offset agreements is the impact they have on 
subcontractors. The large U.S. defense companies that negotiate offset agreements do not 
enter into agreements that adversely affect them. The concessions made are normally felt by 
lower tier producers within the subcontractor base. It is evident from the survey results that 
offset obligations in the form of subcontractor production is the most popular form of offset, 
accounting for over 36 percent of the offset obligations incurred. (OMB, 1990) 
The significance is not only the displacement of work for U.S. subcontractors, but 
more importantly, the increased level of foreign sourcing of weapon system components and 
subassemblies. Foreign sourcing as a result of offset agreements does provide some benefit 
to the U.S. RSI and foreign policy goals are achieved, and while foreign sourcing does carry 
some negative consequences, these negative effects should be contrasted with the belief that 
without such agreements, the sale may not have been made.   As the globalization trend 
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continues, however, the end does not always justify the means, and the level of foreign 
sourcing in U.S. weapon systems remains an issue that warrants further attention. 
As coproduction/development and subcontractor production increasingly become the 
preferred method of cooperation between defense industries, the level of foreign sourcing is 
likely to increase. Foreign defense industries will attempt to reinforce or expand their market 
position at the expense of U.S. competitors. Manufacture of components and subassemblies 
will occur offshore, displacing U.S. near term capacity to produce these items. (OMB, 1990) 
DoD surge requirements to support regional conflicts or general war may not be satisfied due 
to an extended logistics tail between U.S. forces and foreign factories. Political or ideological 
differences may hamper the necessary cooperation to support the U.S. requirement. The U.S. 
has withheld military arms or assistance to encourage other nations to adopt a particular 
stance or take a certain action that is consistent with U.S. foreign policy. As foreign sourcing 
replaces domestic capability and foreign dependence occurs, the U.S. could find itself in a 
similar situation but on the other end of the stick. 
It is not at all clear where foreign sourcing becomes a threat to our national security. 
Of the offset agreements for subcontractor production, 92 percent were with allies and 
friendly nations (OMB, 1988). As time goes on, governments change and the strength of 
these relationships will ebb and flow, increasing the level of uncertainty associated with the 
threat of foreign sourcing. The extent to which U.S. manufactured weapon systems are 
supported by foreign sourced components is also unknown, much to the chagrin of the Joint 
Logistics Commanders whose concern is for the logistics support of U.S. forces in a 
protracted conflict (Zycher, Solomon and Yager, 1991). The intent is not to be reactionary 
and label foreign sourcing as unequivocally bad. To the contrary, foreign sourcing is 
necessary given the increased level of cooperation required of globalization. The old farmer's 
axiom of not putting all your eggs in one basket, however, should also be heeded. 
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B. INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS 
The effects offset agreements have had in the area of industrial competitiveness are 
similar to those in defense preparedness. The measure of success U.S. defense industries have 
had in light of offsets has been favorable. The positive defense trade balance between the 
U.S. and its trading partners is indicative of the benefits flowing into the U.S. as a result of 
military exports influenced by offset agreements. 
Althought the survey data and current information indicate that the U.S. remains the 
world leader in arms production, the advantage has narrowed in recent years. In some areas, 
foreign technical capabilities are now comparable, if not superior, to those of the U.S.. 
Foreign firms have increased the speed with which they adopt and commercialize technology 
developed in the U.S. and have also improved their ability to develop technology on their 
own. (Inman and Burton, 1992) 
Offset agreements have played a role in transferring technology and know-how to 
foreign companies who now compete successfully with U.S. firms for some defense contracts. 
As illustrated by the Boeing sale of AW ACS to Britain, it was beneficial to contribute to the 
capabilities of British aerospace and electronic firms. The subsequent teaming of 
Westinghouse and the British firm Plessey in advanced research in phased array, fiber optics 
and electronic warfare technologies will increase the level of competition in that sector. This 
additional competition could lead to increased quality and reduced prices; however, with the 
reduction in demand for military hardware, U.S. corporations who either cannot compete or 
diversify into other areas will inevitably fail.(Bitzinger, 1994) 
The failure of U.S. corporations is not entirely attributable to offset agreement. As 
Martin Marietta CEO Norman Agustine stated "these are truly Darwinian times." The 
drawdown in defense procurements, coupled with the need for increased cooperation across 
national lines, will weed out inefficient and non-competitive firms. Mergers and joint 
acquisitions are occurring as defense companies restructure to compete in the post-Cold War 
environment. The future will likely see mega-defense corporations emerging from the herd, 
specializing in niche arms markets, reducing the number of subcontractors they work with, 
producing more items internally and maintaining strong qualitative ties with other foreign 
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defense contractors. Lockheed Martin and McDonnel Douglas will continue to be the 
dominant forces in the Aerospace industry, maintaining relationships with British Aerospace 
and Matra of France to support their export business. Such relationships will be necessary 
to maintain access to foreign markets and technologies. 
In addition to reorganizing and changing the face of U.S. defense firms, the U.S. 
defense industry will guard against giving the technology farm away by having something 
better in development. Therein lies an answer to remaining competitive in the international 
arms market in the long term. The future viability and competitiveness of the U.S. defense 
industrial base will be predicated on being able to remain the world leader in military research 
and development, to include both military specific R&D, and spin-on capabilities derived from 
commercial R&D with military application. (DDR&E, 1994) 
U.S. research and development must not only look to the near term to develop the 
next generation of weapons systems to defeat the threat of the future, but it must also be tied 
with the U.S. defense industry in a cooperative program designed to support the defense 
sectors where U.S. dominance is desired. (Inman and Brooks, 1992) 
Reductions in DoD R&D spending and its impact on the private sector means that 
it is unlikely that government or private funds will be available to cover the breadth of 
technology areas. Winners must be chosen and supported. The international diversification 
of the arms industry includes the research and development effort as well. U.S. efforts must 
be focused in the critical areas commensurate with our defense industry strengths. 
As weapon systems become increasingly more sophisticated, the capability of the 
subsystems have also become more critical. For example, building the next generation fighter 
aircraft involves the technological advances in navigation, fire control, composite materials 
and many other areas. Improvements in manufacturing technology will reduce cost and 
increase performance through the use of robotics and micro-circuit design. The number of 
areas is endless. Rather than devoting scarce military R&D funding to all the areas, DoD and 
the defense industry should turn to the commercial sector for potential spin-on technologies 
but maintain an emphasis in defense R&D work. 
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Much of the technology used in military systems is obsolete compared to that available 
in the commercial sector.  Modern computer systems used in artillery and combat aircraft fire 
control systems use microprocessors that have been labeled by the commercial marketplace 
as being obsolete and discarded. Fly-by-light capability could be integral in developing future 
combat aircraft,  a technology spun-on from commercial fiber optics research and 
development. The "not developed here" mentality of the military and defense R&D labs must 
go, replaced by an openness to commercial developments and an effort to adapt their use to 
military applications. A balance must be developed that maintains a heavy defense emphasis 
but capitalizes on commercial efforts in areas where that marketplace is the leader. (Allison 
and Treverton, 1992) 
C. NATIONAL SECURITY 
The effects of offset agreements in diffusing the centers of arms production to other 
industrialized and developing countries may present the greatest challenge to the long-term 
security policies and military capabilities of the United States. 
Arms sales have generally been the focus of the spread of conventional arms 
throughout the world. However, the increasingly internationalized defense industry, an 
atmosphere contributed to by offset agreements, has provided arms production capabilities 
to more countries than previously encountered. Arms production capabilities, unlike arms 
sales, cannot be cut off once provided. 
The U.S. has traditionally provided arms to allied and friendly countries as a means 
to establish a stabilizing factor in regional hot spots. As technology transfers and licensed 
production offset agreements are made, these countries are not longer dependent on U.S. 
support. Indigenous production capabilities could lead to regional arms races between 
traditional adversaries. The spread of arms production does not necessarily threaten the U.S. 
directly, but rather could lead to regional unrest in areas where U.S. interests reside. 
(Bitzinger, 1994) 
Tne development of indigenous arms production capability in the Third World could 
also find some of these countries exporting arms to other developing nations. Brazil and 
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Israel, whose arms transfer policies have been labeled as "no questions asked," could flood 
certain sectors with their weapon systems (Bitzinger, 1994). Specializing in the low-to-mid 
tech weapons market, Third World arms producers could upset regional arms balances and 
accelerate local arms races. Arms transfers from this sector have been generally 
overshadowed by the types of weapons being transferred and their low technology 
characteristics. However, although the sophistication of their weapon systems may be 
obsolete by U.S. standards, they are just as deadly when engaging the less sophisticated forces 
in that region. 
The increase in arms producers may reduce the influence the U.S. may exert by 
threatening to withhold arms deliveries. For example, the U.S. decision in 1974 to stop 
delivery of F-4 Phantom fighters to Saudi Arabia compelled the Saudis to purchase British 
Tornado fighters instead. The number of arms producers today represents alternative sources 
for countries to turn to if U.S. or other Western governments attempt to strongarm their 
actions. (OMB, 1988) 
The contribution to conventional arms proliferation and technology transfer by offset 
agreements may also change the nature of the proliferation problem. As developing countries 
refine their arms technology, the U.S. may find itself threatened by their advanced weapon 
systems. Advances in tactical missile and long-range artillery systems could place U.S. forces 
within their destructive range. The need to combat this new military threat may require 
increases in military spending for force structure and R&D to maintain American military and 
technological advantage. (Bitzinger, 1994) 
Lastly, some types of international arms cooperation, such as tactical missile and 
aircraft development, could lead to development of weapons of mass destruction. The 
concern with control of weapons grade plutonium within the former Soviet Union, along with 
arms cooperation, could reduce both the time and expense for those states contemplating a 
nuclear or chemical warfare capability. (OTA, 1994) 
The Scud missile used during the Gulf War is a very simple and unsophisticated 
weapon system. Armed with a conventional warhead, it is more of a terrorist weapon than 
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of operational or tactical significance due to its inaccuracy. Armed with a nuclear or chemical 
warhead, however, its significance grows. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Overview of Current Initiatives 
The future of U.S. defense preparedness and industrial competitiveness lies in our 
ability to plan for that future. Current U.S. produced weapon systems constitute leading edge 
technology compared to other foreign arms. However, as the U.S. transfers this technology 
abroad, the U.S. must ensure it has something even better in near-term development. The 
President and Congress have recognized that the U.S. lead in technological innovation and 
development is eroding and made technology and competitiveness a national priority. 
The Clinton Administration has developed strategic investment priorities for their 
science and technology (S&T) programs. Their strategy focuses on two generic priorities, 
dual use technology and affordability. 
The U.S. priority in dual use technology is a reflection of the fact that U.S. defense 
industries and associated public and private defense R&D centers cannot be sustained by 
current and future defense budgets. The U.S. recognizes that the defense industry and labs 
are no longer the sole source of defense related technologies. Much of the technology critical 
to national security is currently being developed and matured commercially and 
internationally. In the future, the U.S. must rely on the same industrial base that builds 
commercial products for its future military technological innovation and weapon systems. It 
is an objective of DoD science and technology policy to use the same technology and 
industrial base, where feasible, to build military products and commercial products (DDR&E, 
1994). 
DoD's tactics for achieving their strategic objective include the integration of the 
military and commercial industry to achieve a more cost-effective, single set of industrial 
enterprises that are capable of developing and building more affordable and productive 
military and commercial products (DDR&E, 1994). The defense S&T priorities foster this 
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intergration by preferentially developing technologies that have dual use. 
Each Service has been tasked to develop formal, targeted, dual use programs to 
develop technologies critical to their needs. These formal programs will provide the basis for 
sustained investment into priority technologies, particularly those that are in their infancy. 
DoD's commitment to make early, long-term investments into emerging technologies can ease 
these technologies from their birth through their development until they have matured into 
a stable industry. 
In addition to fostering emerging technologies, DoD is exploiting commercial 
technologies. Commercial technology and products, such as electronics, software and 
communications represent the latest technology available to DoD. By adopting such products 
for defense purposes, DoD can shorten the development time for next generation weapon 
systems and divert scarce DoD R&D funds to areas where a commercial technology or 
product cannot satisfy the requirement. (DDR&E, 1994) 
As a catalyst to adopt commercial products and provide information on defense dual 
use developments, DoD has endeavored to strengthen its technology transfer efforts. Each 
Service is expected to establish a program that facilitates the transfer of technology to other 
DoD and Service laboratories, industry, universities and not-for-profit laboratories. Increased 
participation in regional, state and local alliances is encouraged to aid not only in fostering 
technology transfer, but to monitor what is available in the commercial market, as well as 
other defense-related facilities. 
DoD has developed an aggressive strategic investment program centered around the 
respective Services' efforts in defining and implementing their own S&T programs. Their 
efforts will satisfy the next generation weapon systems and will likely be focused in the 
applied research arena. However, without a similar investment in generic or basic 
technologies, such efforts will only satisfy near-term not our long-term objectives. 
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2. Military and Commercial Research and Development 
In order to address the generic technology area, the President should establish a forum 
to work with industry to identify and set priorities in critical generic technologies, along with 
a plan to implement their development. Agencies such as ARPA, the National Institute of 
Science and Technology (NIST) and the National Science Foundation (NSF) should be part 
of this forum, working with industry to advance U.S. leadership in these critical generic areas. 
(Inman and Burton, 1992) 
DoD's efforts should also encompass what is available or being developed outside our 
borders. Monitoring of commercial and defense technologies should include those being 
developed by foreign countries for possible application to U.S. defense needs. This effort not 
only allows the U.S. to exploit foreign technologies, but serves as an early warning 
intelligence capability. (OTA, 1994) 
U.S. industry must also establish goals to surpass existing capabilities in 
commercializing technologies. Innovative breakthroughs must be taken from the drawing 
board to production line. Building on successful domestic and foreign practices, U.S. 
industry should establish goals and allocate their resources to support their program. (Inman 
and Burton, 1992) 
Basic research conducted at universities should also have closer ties to industry and 
focus their effort more effectively in areas where there are real technology needs. 
3. Foreign Sourcing 
The Department of Defense should continue to assess its current dependency on 
foreign sources for critical components in weapon systems and monitor future systems. DoD 
should develop a measure of when this foreign sourcing becomes a threat to our national 
security. In areas determined to be a threat, DoD should take steps to second source these 
components from other domestic or foreign companies. DoD acquisition strategies should 
include the capability to second source critical components through the purchase of technical 
data rights or cultivate a second source during system development/production. 
If second sourcing is not cost-effective or possible, other diplomatic or alternative 
means should be implemented to mitigate dependency by fostering relationships with the 
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foreign government or firm. 
4. Defense Industrial Base 
The U.S. Government should enhance the competitiveness of U.S. industry abroad 
by facilitating their market position in the international marketplace. Review of the cold war 
trade policies and export restrictions should progress beyond its current state of being mired 
in bureaucratic discussion. U.S. trade policies and export restrictions should endeavor to 
foster U.S. industry's ability to cooperate. U.S. technology transfer and security policies must 
shift from their protectionist bias, to one that supports industry-to-industry cooperation. This 
policy must have a delicate balance, supporting not only this cooperation, but also guarding 
U.S. critical military technologies and addressing other foreign policy issues such as arms 
proliferation. Such technology and foreign policy goals should be identified and supported. 
(OTA, 1994) 
The restricted technology transfer and export control lists should not be static, but 
evolutionary supported by innovative technological investment that allows non-nuclear 
technology and material to be transferred when replaced by something even better. With the 
emphasis on dual-use technology, excessive control of its military application will largely be 
undermined by its inevitable transfer in the commercial market. (Johnson, 1990) 
U.S. export controls for items that are available from other countries in similar quality 
and quantity should also be removed. Such actions would level the playing field between U.S. 
defense firms and foreign firms that operate under less stringent export controls. (OTA, 1994) 
Government acquisition and regulatory policies should be revised to boost U.S. 
industry performance and competitiveness. NIST and industry should develop dual military- 
industrial standards to reduce the barrier between defense industries competing effectively in 
the commercial marketplace. This effort will aid defense companies, whose strategy calls for 
diversification into non-defense industries as a result of the decline in demand for arms, to 
transition smoothly into this new endeavor. (Inman and Burton, 1992) 
The U.S. Government must recognize that its defense industrial base will contract 
from its previous size.   Efforts to preserve inefficient, non-competitive firms should be 
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redirected to supporting defense firms that are indicative of U.S. critical capabilities and goals. 
5. Globalization 
The challenge to the U.S. presented by globalization is to determine how best to 
support globalization's positive economic features while ensuring that this process does not 
adversely affect U.S. security and foreign policy interests. In concert with other industrialized 
nations, the U.S. must carefully balance its defense industrial base needs against its national 
security concerns. A distinction must be made between bad globalization and good. 
(Bitzinger, 1994) 
A collective body of industrialized nations may adopt a two-tiered approach, one that 
distinguishes between arms collaboration within their collective body and armaments 
cooperation involving the developing world, where the risks of proliferation and of 
heightening regional tensions are higher. 
The U.S. needs to better integrate and coordinate the oversight and regulatory 
functions of its various governmental departments and agencies. A lead agency should be 
given responsibility for the review of all defense-related globalization initiatives, to include 
transnational industry collaboration. Most importantly, though, is the development of a 
coherent and unified set of policies to provide the basis for government oversight regarding 
globalization. (Bitzinger, 1994) 
6. Export Controls and Proliferation 
The quandry that the U.S. finds itself in is the growing need for increased 
collaboration with foreign countries to preserve a viable defense industrial base, all the while 
maintaining sufficient controls to ensure that the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass 
detruction and missiles that deliver them does not escalate out of control. Export hawks and 
non-proliferation doves are in a tug-of-war to determine the appopriate balance between 
export promotion and export control. While proliferation is at the top of the foreign policy 
agenda, economic imperatives seemingly have tipped the balance away from national security 
considerations toward a more liberal export policy (Schneider, 1994). 
The Clinton administration has attempted to streamline the implementation of U.S. 
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non-proliferation export controls by balancing the need for more exports with requirement 
to prevent exports that would make a material contribution to the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction (White House, 1993). In line with this streamlining policy, President 
Clinton has also eased U.S. export controls on computers and telecommunications 
technologies, allowing more high-speed computers to be sold abroad (Wolfsthal, 1993). 
The Administration's efforts are an attempt to influence the supply-side non- 
proliferation activities by making it more difficult for countries aspiring to nuclear capability 
to obtain the sensitive technologies, material and know-how to develop such weapons. In 
addition to the current technology available, the U.S. must not lose sight of older technology, 
which is perhaps more useful to nuclear aspiring countries. Nuclear weapons produced by 
technology from the Manhattan Project are just as deadly as those produced by more modern 
means. Third World countries can more readily absorb the older technology and processes 
in developing their nuclear capability than the newer ones due to the additional infrastructure 
and costs associated with the latest methods (Sands, 1994). 
The denial of nuclear weapons related technology and material, in and of itself, is not 
the answer to the non-proliferation question. Similar controls have been in effect since 1945 
but have not prevented proliferation to other industrialized and developing nations. Supply- 
side proliferations efforts should continue to be combined with diplomatic initiatives, security 
guarantees and regional arms control (Sands, 1994). 
The U.S., along with other industrialized countries, must use its influence with the 
Third World to combat the emergence of the arms industries in the developing world. Use 
of foreign assistance or the withholding of that assistance could be a valuable tool of 
encouragement. (Bitzinger, 1994) 
The industrialized nations, to include Russia and the former Warsaw Pact countries, 
should continue to pursue the objective of establishing a new international control regime, 
similar to the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls.13 Its charter should 
I3This COCOM was established during the Cold War to restrict Western high-tech exports 
to communist bloc and other threatening countries. It was disestablished in early 1994. 
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include the control of technologies to the developing world that have direct or indirect 
application to armaments production, particularly weapons of mass destruction. While 
current attempts to develop a new international control regime are mired in the fear of 
exposing national industries to global competition, such fear must be displaced by the greater 
concern of controlling arms proliferation. (Hitchens and Opall, 1994) 
U.S. export controls can be enhanced by developing a shared and improved database 
of export items, buyers and end-users that pose a proliferation risk. The Departments of 
Energy, Commerce, State and Defense and other agencies can collectively use the information 
to distribute and analyze information on the proliferation problem. The intelligence agencies 
can provide valuable information in assessing a buyer's nuclear program and the threat of a 
third party transfer to a state that would not normally receive U.S. approval to acquire nuclear 
related material or technology. (OTA, 1994) 
In addition to internal export controls and the establishment of a new international 
control regime, improvements in coordination between other nuclear supplier countries should 
be made.   The U.S. pilot program for a shared computer network among the Nuclear 
Suppliers' Group14 (NSG) is an example of the communications and information tools 
necessary to achieve this cooperation. Such a network would increase coordination between 
the nuclear suppliers. Information pertaining to the denial of a nuclear related export license 
by one member country would be available to other countries. Once refused an export license 
in one country, a potential buyer would not be able to receive an export license from another 
member country (OTA, 1994). Similar networks could be established in other export control 
regimes such as the Australia Group (chemical and biological weapons) and the Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to provide similar advantages. 
14
 The NSG is a group of nations that have agreed to common export control policies for 
nuclear technologies and dual-use technologies applicable to nuclear programs. 
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U.S. export controls, combined with multilateral control arrangements, whether they 
be information sharing networks or expanded intelligence sharing, will aid the nuclear supplier 
countries in making informed decisions regarding the export of nuclear related technology 
and material. 
E. FUTURE RESEARCH AREAS 
This research evaluated the effects of offset agreements and the part they have played 
in the globalization of the arms industry. Further research in the area of globalization, to 
include U.S. industry reaction, the nature of transnational defense industry collaboration and 
the degree of success ofthat collaboration is appropriate. 
Furthermore , this research also highlighted the implications of globalization in the 
context of foreign sourcing and dependency. An evaluation of the level of foreign sourcing 
of U.S. weapon systems, with an analysis of its implications on U.S. national security and 
how it affects military contingency planning and doctrine would provide valuable insight into 
the challenges the U.S. faces in this new era of international cooperation. 
The importance of funding future U.S. research and development efforts and their 
significance in strengthening the U.S. defense industrial base was discussed. With the current 
push to get government spending and the deficit under control, funding for R&D both in DoD 
facilities and for cooperative programs with industry will be limited. Research into the best 
allocation of these limited Federal funds would be beneficial. 
Lastly, an evaluation of the developing countries' armaments production capabilities 
in light of U.S. regional interests needs further attention. How should the U.S. respond from 
a foreign policy perspective to this challenge, considering its implications for arms 
proliferation and possible heightening of regional unrest? 
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